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INTRODUCTION

This Article argues that the recusal procedure used in the
vast majority of American courtrooms today, and for nearly all of
American history, is unconstitutional. The procedure allows the
judge or justice whose impartiality is questioned-generally
(though not always) in a motion for recusal filed by one of the
parties-to decide for himself or herself whether recusal is
warranted. I will demonstrate that this procedure violates the Due
Process Clause because it allows the challenged judge to act as a
"judge in his own cause." 1 At first blush, that may sound like an
outrageous claim. After all, how can a procedure with such an
impressive pedigree-over 235 years of acceptance in the United
States, and centuries beyond that in England-violate a bedrock
principle of constitutionalism, recognized in the common law since
at least the beginning of the seventeenth century?2 But as this
Article will show, we should not be surprised that judges have not
declared the practice unconstitutional, as judges themselves have
an interest in its continued existence.
Although this Article is the first to argue that the American
recusal procedure is unconstitutional, recusal has been a hot topic
of late.a And even though much of the focus has been on the

1 Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P.) (recognizing the
principle of~nemo iudex in causa sua," or "no man shall be a judge in his own cause").
2
3

Id.
In fact, there is a quickly growing body of literature on judicial recusal. A few

recent articles have looked at due process concerns arising out of substantive recusal
decisions. See, e.g., Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and
Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977 (2011); Gabriel D.
Serbulea, Comment, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform,
38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109 (2011); Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression:
Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563
(2004). In addition, one author has looked at potential separation-of-powers concerns of
congressional regulation of the Supreme Court's recusal rules. Louis J. Virelli III, The
(Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 Wrs. L. REV. 1181
[hereinafter Virelli, Supreme] (arguing that Congress may not set the recusal
standards for the judiciary without violating separation of powers doctrine). Recusal
procedure has not received similar constitutional treatment. This Article fills that gap.
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substantive recusal standards, or specific recusal decisions, 4
recusal procedure, which has long been neglected by scholars, has
finally garnered some much-needed attention. In particular,
scholars have begun to criticize the self-recusal procedure followed
in thousands of state and federal courts throughout the country,
referring to self-recusal as "problematic,"5 "troubling," 6 and
"bizarre." 7 I, too, have previously criticized our approach to
recusal, suggesting that the judiciary and the legislature should
take greater heed of recusal's effect on appearances in drafting
recusal legislation.a And recently, Congress has joined the chorus
of critics of the Supreme Court's recusal rules, calling for the
Court to pay more attention to issues of judicial ethics. 9
But rather than rehashing those oft-repeated criticisms, this
Article looks at recusal procedure from an entirely new,
constitutional perspective. Specifically, it asks whether the self
recusal procedure violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and in particular the guarantee of impartiality
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has
frequently referred to judicial impartiality as the sine qua non of
the American legal system generally, and of the Due Process
Clause in particular. Unquestionably, due process requires a fair
and impartial tribunal for all phases of litigation, including pre
trial motions like the motion for recusal. And not only is the
presence of a fair and disinterested judge a critical component of
due process, but it is the means by which all our rights,
fundamental and otherwise, are preserved in the legal system.
4 Non-recusals by Supreme Court Justices have received particular coverage in
the media, as well as scholarly literature.
5 Louis J. Virelli Ill, Congress, the Constitution, and Sllpreme Court Recusal, 69
WASH. & LEE: L. RF:V. 1535, 1554 (2012) [hereinafter Virelli, Congress] (discussing
Supreme Court recusal practice and describing the self-recusal procedure as
"problematic").
6 Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2002) [hereinafter Bassett, Judicial] (referring to recusal
procedureR followed by federal courts as «troubling").
1
John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 237, 242 (1987) (noting the "bizarre rule" permitting "the very judge whose acts
are alleged to be warped by unconscious bias to decide whether there is an adequate
showing of bias").
" Dmitry Barn, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias,
2011 BYU L. REV. 943.
9 Id. at 946-47.
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The entire adversarial system, in fact, depends on the presence of
a neutral referee to resolve the disputes vigorously presented by
the lawyers in the case. The Court's due process jurisprudence
leads to the inescapable conclusion that a recusal procedure that
(a) does not ensure litigants a trial in front of an impartial judge,
or (b) permits the participation of a judge with an interest in the
outcome of a dispute is unconstitutional as violative of due
process. This Article argues that the self-recusal procedure fails
on both prongs.
The particular element that renders the American recusal
procedure unconstitutional is that the same judge whose recusal is
sought-the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned
decides whether recusal is required. The United States inherited
this self-recusal procedure from England, and self-recusal has
remained dominant in the United States since the founding.Io
Admittedly, some state courts, at various.levels of their respective
state judiciaries, and even a few federal courts, have implemented
different local recusal procedures that allow for a neutral
decisionmaker to hear, and decide, motions for recusaL Such
alternative approaches will be discussed later in the Article, but
these courts are the exception, while self-recusal has long been,
and continues to be, the rule. Self-recusal is also the only
procedure followed by the United States Supreme Court. In other
words, the Justices decide for themselves whether recusal is
warranted, and their decisions are not only unreviewable by their
colleagues, but are also unappealable to any other court because of
the Court's place on top of the judicial pyramid.
The appeal to history and practice is perhaps the strongest
criticism of my argument. But despite its initial attractiveness, I
believe the historical defense of self-recusal fails. Our recusal
regime is built on a factual framework that has started to crack.
The formalistic assumptions that the identity and the background
of the judge do not matter have long been debunked by legal

10

Id. at 952.
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theorists. We know now that a judge's upbringing,11 family,12
political preferences,13 and even personal characteristics like race
and gender,14 are important attributes of judicial decision-making.
The recusal scheme rests on similar, and similarly unfounded,
assumptions: assumptions that judges can set aside their personal
biases when they don their robes, and that judges deciding their
own recusal motions can evaluate their own conduct and
impartiality using an objective "reasonable person" standard.
These assumptions have also been convincingly challenged in
social science literature. But scholars and courts have been slow to
account for that evidence, and have failed to assess the
constitutional implications of the research on bias conducted by
psychologists and social scientists. This Article takes up that
assessment, and concludes that judicial recusal procedures-in
particular the procedures followed by the United States Supreme
Court-violate the guarantees of due process. I argue that when
we accept, not avoid, psychological and other social science
scholarship, the constitutional foundation for our recusal practice
collapses entirely.
The self-recusal procedure also rests on a misunderstanding
of recusal. Or, more accurately, it rests on an outdated, formalistic
understanding of recusal. Formally, recusal is a dispute between
the two litigants appearing in front of the judge. But that
misconstrues the recusal motion. Because generally only one party

11
See Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, The Influence of a Jewish Education and Jewish
Values on a Jewish Judge, 29 TOURO L. REV. 517, 523 (2Dl:l) (describing the influence
that a judge's religious upbringing can have on judging).
12 A recent study showed that judges with daughters decide cases in favor of
women's rights more often than judges with only sons or no children at all. See Adam
N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Hauing Daughters Cause
Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. Sci. 37, 45-4 7 (2015).
'" See Fll.ANK B. CHOSS, DBCISION MAKING JN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 201-02
(2007); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004) (finding
that political preferences play important roles in judicial decisionmaking). In legal
literature, this has come to be known as the "attitudinal model" of judging. JEFFREY A.

SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 86 (2002) (explaining that judges frequently make decisions based on their

political preferences).
14 Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in
Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 7, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/race_gendcr_of.judges_makc_cnormous_differences_in_ruIi n g
s_studies_find_aba/.
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seeks the judge's recusal, the other party in litigation plays no role
on the recusal question. Most often, the opposing party remains
silent because it does not have the facts necessary to oppose the
motion. After all, the judge is the one who can answer the
allegations of bias or impartiality, not the litigants. Functionally,
then, the recusal dispute is between the moving party and the
judge, not between two litigants. Once the dispute is properly
understood as such, any recusal procedure that allows a party to
the dispute (here, the judge) to resolve the dispute faces a strong
presumption of unconstitutionality. It is a presumption that
proponents of self-recusal cannot overcome.
Part I of this Article discusses the substantive and procedural
recusal standards, with an eye towards how those standards have
developed over the last two centuries. Although the substantive
standards have undergone a significant transformation, I will
show that recusal procedures have remained stagnant. This
decoupling of procedure from substance has far-reaching
implications-a procedure that made sense under the common-law
recusal standard makes little sense given our current approach to
recusal. Part I will also explain the theoretical underpinning
supporting the law's approach to the recusal procedure, and how
that foundation was formed centuries ago based on incorrect
factual assumptions (that judges could set aside their bias when
elevated to the judicial office) and a misguided view of recusal.
Part II then looks at judicial decisions interpreting the Due
Process Clause, paying particular attention to the Supreme
Court's case law establishing litigants' due process right to a fair
and impartial judge. At the heart of the Court's jurisprudence is
the "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" standard. Here, I
will discuss how the meaning of this standard has evolved from a
very limited common law principle that a judge must not have a
financial interest in the case's outcome to the Court's current
insistence that a judge free of bias is the lynchpin of the Due
Process Clause and is a basic constitutional guarantee for all
litigants. These decisions highlight the importance of judicial
impartiality to our concept of fairness and justice. In fact, the
Court has suggested that even the appearance of impartiality is
guaranteed by the clause. This part, therefore, also explains the
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role that appearances have played in the Court's decisions, as well
as the importance of appearances to the judiciary's success.
Part III forms the core of my argument. Here, I argue that
the self-recusal procedure is constitutionally problematic in two
different ways. First, to the extent that the Due Process Clause
protects even the appearance of impartiality, the self-recusal
procedure fails to foster such an appearance. Summarizing the
work of legal process theorists and procedural fairness scholars, I
conclude that one of the key components of the appearance of
impartiality is the presence of a neutral decisionmaker. No
reasonable person, however, perceives the judge whose
impartiality is under attack as such an impartial decisionmaker.
Second, the self-recusal procedure allows the judge to act as a
"judge in his own cause," something the Due Process Clause
prohibits. I reach this conclusion because the motion for
disqualification, unlike any other pre-trial motion, challenges the
judge's own conduct, and should be understood as a dispute
between the challenging party and the judge, rather than as a
dispute between two litigants. Thus properly understood, the
judge is resolving a dispute to which she is herself a party,
meaning that the judge has an interest in the outcome of the
motion.
Finally, in Part IV, I propose alternative recusal procedures
that alleviate, or at the very least minimize, the effect of the
cognitive biases outlined in Part III. Each recommendation
involves shifting the recusal decision to an independent third
party: another judge, a group of other judges, or an independent
group of non-judges. Of course, these procedures come with their
own set of warts, hurdles and drawbacks, and these, too, will be
addressed here. But these solutions, if implemented, would not
only address the concerns about the quality of judicial
decisionmaking on recusal issues, but also foster an appearance of
impartiality. I stop short of recommending a universal recusal
procedure that all state and federal courts should follow. Rather,
each state, as well as the federal government, should come up
with a process that works well for its own judiciary, taking into
account such factors as the size of the judiciary (a procedure that
works well for New York courts may not for those in Wyoming) as
well as the level of the judiciary (different recusal procedures may
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be appropriate for trial courts and appellate courts). In proposing
these alternatives, Part IV also considers an unusual practical
problem that arises in the context of arguably unconstitutional
actions by the judiciary: what happens when the Supreme Court's
own procedures arguably violate the Due Process Clause? Finally,
Part IV shows how changes in recusal procedure can alleviate
some other concerns associated with judicial elections; namely, the
problem of judges who accept contributions from litigants and
lawyers who appear in front of them, and the problem of judges
who appear to pre-commit themselves to rule a certain way on
particular issues in the course of their election campaigns.ts

I. RECUSAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

A. The Importance of Recusal
In recent years, the issue of judicial disqualification•G has
become ubiquitous.17 A federal judge has referred to it as the
"topic du jour"; 1 8 academics describe it as "hot."19 And hot it is.
Seemingly every high-profile case, at both state and federal levels,
has involved a recusal controversy. From federal challenges to the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act20 and restrictions on

10 This is a particular problem in criminal cases where judicial candidates often
promise the electorate that they will be "tough-on-crime." See Keith Swisher, Pro
Prosemtion ,Judges: "Tough on Crime,•• Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010).
is I use "recusal" and "disqualification" interchangeably. Although the words have
historically had slightly different meanings, most scholars now use both terms
synonymously. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (2d ed. 2007). "In fact, in modern practice
'disqualification' and 'rccusal' are frequently viewed as synonymous, and employed
interchangeably." Id. (footnote omitted).
" Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial
Disqualification-and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities,
30 REV. LITIG. 733, 735 (2011) ("[I]ssues of judicial impartiality and disqualification are
at the forefront of contemporary debates about the state of the legal system.")_
18 M. Margaret McKeown, Don't Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005).
19 Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV.
LITIG. 671, 672 (2011).
w Numerous commentators called for the recusal of Justice Elena Kagan because
of her previous work as Solicitor General. See Robert Barnes, Health-Care Case Brings
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same-sex marriage,2 1 to state criminal prosecutions of George
Zimmerman 2 2 and Aaron Hernandez,23 recusal has been a
common thread uniting all of these disparate cases. Over the last
decade, nearly every Supreme Court Justice has faced calls for
recusal,24 and a number of highly publicized cases have led to

Fight Ouer Which Supreme Court Justices Should Decide It, WASH. POST (Nov. 27,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-care-case-brings-fight-over-which
-suprerne-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11122/gIQAwRWb2N_story.html. Others
called for Justice Clarence Thomas to step aside because of his wife's opposition to the
Affordable Care Act and her work to repeal it, as well as Justice Thomas's own
participation at events sponsored by the Affordable Care Act's opponents. See, e.g.,
Editorial, The Supreme Court's Recusal Problem, N.Y. T!MF.S, Dec. 1, 2011, at A38;
Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, auailable at
http://www. newyorker.comfmagazinc/2011108129/partners-jeffrey- too bin (reporting on
the calls for Justice Thomas's rixusaJ from challenges to the Affordable Care Act).
21 The challenges to the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8 included calls
for recusal at all three levels of the federal judiciary. Some questioned whether Judge
Vaughn Walker could preside over the trial given his own long-term relationship with
another man. See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article Ill Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 567
68 (2012). On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Proposition 8 proponents demanded that
Judge Reinhardt step aside because his wife was the head of the ACLU of Southern
California and had submitted an amicus brief against Proposition 8. See Douglas
NeJairne, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 732-33 (2012}. Finally,
when the case got to the Supreme Court, supporters of Proposition 8 called for Justice
Scalia to step aside because he had previously expressed his views about the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. See Michael Russnow, Scalia's Gay Stance
ls Unacceptable: Recusal from Supreme Court Deliberations on DOMA and California
Proposition 8 Is Called for, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2012, 8:53 AM),
http :lfwww .huf'fingtonpost.com/michael-ru ssnow/scalias-gay-stance-is- una_b_2298838.
html.
22 Circuit Judge Jessica Recksiedler recused herself at the request of George
Zimmerman's counsel because "her husband's law partner .. _ ha[d] been hired to give
commentary on the case for CNN." See Madison Gray, Trayuon Martin Case Gets New
Judge
After Recusal,
TIME
(Apr.
18,
2012),
http://newsfeed.time.com/
2012/04/18/trayvon~martin-case-gets-new-judgc-after-rccusall.
23 Judge Susan Garsh denied the prosecution's recusal motion. The lead prosecutor
sought recusal because Judge Garsh "made erroneous rulings and treated him with
disrespect in a 2010 murder trial." Kevin Vaughan, Recusal Denied in Hernandez Case,
Fox SPORTS (June 2, 2014, 1:56 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfllstoryfaaron
hcrnandez-murder-case-judge- susan-garsh-refuse-recusal-102113.
""' Justices Alita, Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas have been
criticized for interacting with groups that are likely to appear, or have appeared, before
the Court, as well as for their involvement with conservative or liberal organizations
like the Federalist Society, American Constitution Society, and the Koch brothers. See
Nan Aron, An Ethics Code for the High Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent/article/20ll/03/13/AR2011031303258.
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significant scrutiny of the Supreme Court's approach to recusal.25
While some scholars have suggested that these may be "false
controvers[ies],"26 and undoubtedly some of the recusal challenges
had more merit than others, there is no denying that they are
controversies nonetheless, attracting significant media and
scholarly attention.27 And these are just the cases that received
national media coverage. In the lower federal courts, as well as in
state courts, a number of judges have been criticized by the media
and judicial ethics scholars for not recusing in various contexts.28
Many of these decisions remain out of the public limelight, with
only the litigants and court-watchers seething over a judge's non
recusal decision.
And recusal has not been a mere sideshow in cases dealing
with other substantive issues. Just three years ago, the Supreme
Court addressed recusal head-on in a high-profile case.29 In
Caperton v. Massey, the Court ruled that, in some circumstances,
a state judge who has received campaign contributionsao from one

html; Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court Justices, NPR
(Aug. 17, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/20111081 l 7 /1 396465 73/bill-puts-ethics
spotlight-on -supreme-court-justices. The Justices have overwhelmingly rejected these
calls for recu sal.
is Justice Scalia's non-recusal in early 2004 is one of the most highly publicized
incidents. That is when ,Justice Scalia famously went on a duck hunting trip with Vice
President Dick Cheney while a lawsuit against Cheney was pending before the Court.
See Jeffrey Rosen, The Justice W'ho Came to Dinner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004 at 4(1).
is James Sample, Supreme Court Recusal from Marbury to the Modern Day, 26
GEO.•J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 98 (2013) (questioning the legitimacy of some recent rccusal
controversies).
a7 Of course, the issue of judicial disqualification goes back to the founding. To this
day, scholars debate whether Chief Justice Marshall should have been disqualified
from hearing Marbury v. Madison, a case in which Marshall's own failure to deliver a
commission that he had signed and scaled as the Secretary of State was a key fact. Id.
at 106-07.
is Often, these concerns arise in the context of judicial elections, when a judge does
not recuse herself after receiving campaign contributions from one of the parties. But
even outside the election context, wc continue to see news stories critical of judges'
recusal decisions.
29 So high profile, in fact, that it was the subject of John Grisham's bestselling
novel, The Appeal. See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best
Seller, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2009, 10:12 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
washingtonf2009-02-16-grisham-court_N .htrn.
Bo Caperton v. A.'l'. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). This case actually
involved independent expenditures by Massey's CEO. The distinction between
expenditures and contributions is a crucial one in election law, but the Court
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of the litigants must recuse himself from hearing a case involving
that contributor.3 1 Immediately following the Caperton decision, a
number of state courts were forced to reconsider the
constitutionality, and the propriety, of their recusal systems. The
contentious nature of the recusal debates in Wisconsin3Z and
Michigan33 show that recusal is at the forefront of the judiciary's
collective mind.
The federal judiciary, too, has had to directly address its own
recusal controversies. Chief Justice Roberts devoted the entirety
of his 2011 Annual Year-End Report to issues of judicial ethics
generally, and recusal in particular.34 And Justice Scalia, after the
infamous duck-hunting incident involving then-Vice President
Dick Cheney, wrote a defensive opinion justifying his decision to
remain on the case.35 Justice Scalia's decision attracted negative
media attention and a sustained outcry.as
The interest in recusal extends far beyond the judiciary, as
members of Congress have also stepped into the fray. After
revelations of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's involvement with
the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund, thirteen Republican Congressmen wrote a letter
requesting Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future cases
dealing with abortion.37 More recently, Justices Breyer, Kennedy,
consistently referred to the expenditures as campaign contributions. This left some
scholars questioning whether the distinction maintains its relevance in the recusal
context. See ,James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial
Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727 (2011).
"' Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. Caperton is discussed in greater detail below. See
infra Part II.A.
33 Wisconsin was one of the first states to modify its recusal rules after the
Caperton decision. See Ben P. McGreevy, Comment, Heeding the Message: Procedural
Recusal Reform in Idaho After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 46 IDAHO L. REV. 699,
716-19 (2010).
33 The fierce debates on changes to the recusal procedure within the Michigan
Supreme Court are discussed in greater detail below.
;• See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END RF.PORT ON TH1"
FEDF.RAL Jumcwn (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfolyear
end/2 0 l lyear-endreport.pdf.
as See Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in
the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229 (2004).
36 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 IIAsTINGS L.J. 657,
659 & n.8 (2005) [hereinafter Bassett, Recusal).
37 GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2004), http:/Iarticles .la times.com/2004/ mar/ 19/na tionlna-gi n sburg 19,
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and Scalia have been called to testify in front of Congress on
recusal issues,38 and Senators have written letters to Chief Justice
Roberts asking the Court to adopt the recusal requirements in the
Judicial Conference of the United States Code of Conduct for
United States Judges.39 Then-Congressman Anthony Weiner led
the (unsuccessful) charge calling for Justice Thomas's recusal in
NFIB v. Sebelius, frequently appearing on national television to
expound his views. 40 And recently, a federal judge was impeached
in part because of his failure to recuse himself "from a case in
which he had solicited money from an attorney in a pending
case." 41
Recusal issues have also gripped the academy. Recently, 138
law professors wrote a letter to the House & Senate Judiciary
Committees, calling for reform of the Supreme Court's recusal
standards.42 And scholarship on issues of judicial recusal and
disqualification has increased exponentially, filling the pages of
law reviews. 43 What had once been a niche topic, of interest only
to relatively few ethicists, has evolved into one of "the most high
profile and controversial issues involving the [Supreme] Court." 44
Even scholars outside the relatively cloistered world of judicial
ethics have begun to see recusal as a central battleground issue in
the national debate about judicial independence and
impartiality.45

"' Virelli, Congress, supra note 5, at 1538 n.5.
39 Id. at 1537 n.4. As it stands today, Supreme Court Justices arc the only federal
judges not subject to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. See Bassett,
Recusal, supra note 36, at 678. Numerous bills have been introduced to impose a code
of conduct on the Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2011).
'° America Live (FOX News television broadcast Mar. 2, 2011), available at
http:flvideo.foxnews.comfv/3067814 7 4100 l/anthony-wciner-discusscs-calls-for-hcalth·
carc-recusall'?#sp=show-clips.
• 1 Geyh, supra note 19, at 674 (describing impeachment of Louisiana District Judge
G. Thomas Porteous).
•2 See Virelli, Supreme, supra note 3, at 1225.
•a See generally Virelli, Congress, supra note 5.
04 Id. at 1537.
'" See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons
of Caperton, 123 HARV. L, REV. 80, 81 (2009).
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B. Recusal Statutes and Codes
Understanding the problems with current recusal procedure
and the constitutional objection that this Article raises requires at
least a short description of the substantive recusal standards, as
well as how they have evolved since the founding. Additionally,
the history of judicial disqualification highlights the judiciary's
traditional ambivalence towards the issue, something that will
become more important later in the Article. Therefore, this section
will briefly describe the history and development of the
substantive law of recusal and identify the current state of the law
in the United States.
In the United States, judicial disqualification is controlled by
state and federal statutes. Although American disqualification law
grew directly out of the common law tradition, American judges
have historically been held to a more stringent recusal standard
than judges in England. Under British common law as it existed
before American independence, financial interest was the sole
basis for judicial disqualification, and the founding generation
adopted the same simple and narrow recusal rule.46 But almost
immediately following the ratification of the Constitution,
Congress passed the United States' first recusal statute.47 That
statute has been frequently amended, and its descendant, 28
U.S.C. § 455,48 is the most important federal recusal statute
today. Under that statute, a judge's financial interest in the case
is now only one of many potential disqualifying factors. Additional
factors include familial and professional connections to the parties
or their counsel, prejudice, partiality, bias, and knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts.49 The most important provision of the
statute is its broad catch-all provision, Section 455(a), which
proscribes even the appearance of bias.ao But despite
F!.AMM, supra note 16, at 6.
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79.
48 This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in
1821 (Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643), in 1891 (Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26
Stat. 826), then again in 1911 (Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090),
and recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948.
•• See FLAMM, supra note 16, at 669-822 (surveying disqualification rules in state
and federal courts).
50 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Unlike Section 455(a), which
offers a general rccusal standard, "Section 455(b) . . . lists specific circumstances
46
47
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congressional efforts to broaden and expand the disqualification
standards, judges have always interpreted the statute narrowly,
leading to persistent modification and expansion of the recusal
rules.51
A second recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, applies only to
federal district court judges.52 The statute allows litigants to
disqualify a trial judge for any alleged bias or prejudice, and was
intended to limit judges' discretion about when to recuse. 5 3 In a
sense, this statute was designed to give litigants a peremptory
challenge to federal district court judges, taking the recusal
decision out of the hands of the judge himself and putting it into
the hands of the moving party.5 4 But here, too, judges have
interpreted the statute narrowly, essentially requiring litigants to
adequately allege evidence of bias despite the peremptory nature
of the statute, and thus undermining the key purpose of the
statute.55
Some states have passed judicial disqualification statutes of
their own. Although these state statutes have been adopted at
various points throughout American history, they uniformly take
a similar approach to recusaJ.56 Just like the federal recusal
statutes, most state counterparts identify specific circumstances
that require judges to recuse themselves.57 Financial interest,
independent knowledge of the issues in the case, and involvement
in the underlying case are perhaps the most common bases for
mandatory recusal.58 In addition, most statutes require recusal
requmng disqualification. . . . Section 455(b) is implicated in cases involving
allegations of personal bias or prejudice, or when the judge's relationships and
interests-including prior employment, family relationships, and financial intcrcsts
create a conflict of interest." Barn, supra note 8, at 954-55; see also Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to
Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (2005). Not only are judges reluctant
to acknowledge their biases, but bias is a difficult concept to define.
•• See 28 U.S.C. § 141 (2012).
•3 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921).
:.. See the discussion of judicial peremptory challenges in Part IV.
•• See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at J 221.
•• Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-Fir.~t Century: Tracing the Trends,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2004) ("[T]he rules of recusal in state courts generally
are similar to the federal statutory provisions.~).
01 Id.
•s See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
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not just for actual bias or a risk of bias, but also for the
appearance of bias, and most include a catch-all provision, similar
to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), that requires recusal when a judge's
impartiality could reasonably be questioned.59
In addition to the federal and state disqualification statutes,
recusal issues are also a matter of judicial ethics. Nearly every
state has adopted the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial
Conduct.60 These codes govern judicial disqualification in almost
all American courts,61 and apply to the conduct of all full-time
judges62 and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.63 A key
provision of the code is Rule 2.11, which states: "A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . . "64 The
rules define "impartiality" as the "absence of bias or prejudice in
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well
See Miner, supra note 56, at 1116.
The original Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924 by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, and ultimately by a majority of the states
over the course of the next five decades. The House of Delegates adopted more explicit
standards of judicial conduct in 1972, and ultimately adopted a revised Model Code of
Judicial Conduct in 1990. That Code was superseded by a revised Code adopted in
February 2007 by the ABA House of Delegates. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2007), auailable at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_
approved.pdf.
6' Forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or another. Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might
Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GW. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000).
6'
The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See
Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void
in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGF.:RS L. REV. 107, 111 {2004). In light of recent
controversies surrounding recusal of Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Scalia
and Thomas, some commentators and law professors have called on the Court to either
adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to impose such adoption upon the Court. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
63 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that
applies to most federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. That
Code, adopted and revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, does not
govern the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, however, because the
Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme Court. See Richard
K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v, Gore: Did Some Justices Vote
Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2003).
84 MODEL CODE OF ,JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list
specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed,
although the list is not exhaustive.
:;9
00
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as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may
come before a judge."65 These disqualification standards, then, do
not depart much from the disqualification standards under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a): both have been interpreted to impose an
appearance-based disqualification standard.66

C. Recusal Procedures
In an article focused on the constitutionality of American
recusal procedure, one might expect the section describing current
recusal procedures and developing their origins and evolution to
be one of the longest, if not the longest, in the article. But that will
not be the case, for both the history, and the practice, of recusal
procedure in the United States are simple and straightforward.
While the substantive recusal standard has undergone substantial
transformation since Congress's passage of the first federal
recusal statute, the recusal procedure has largely remained the
same. Just as eighteenth century judges and justices in the United
States decided their own recusal motions, twenty-first century
judges and justices have continued this practice. Within the
judiciary, although some courts have suggested that recusal
motions must be referred to a neutral judge,67 most courts
continue the practice of allowing such recusal motions to be heard
by the challenged judge.68
Think back to some of the biggest recusal controversies in
recent years. There are criminal cases and civil cases. There are
federal cases and state cases. There are trial court cases and
appellate cases. But one common thread unites all of these
disparate cases: in each case, the judge (or justice) whose recusal
was sought made the final-sometimes unreviewable-decision
whether to step aside. In theory, the judge made that decision by
carefully examining his or her own conduct and determining that
not only was the judge not biased, but that no reasonable person
could believe that the judge was improperly biased. In all of these

Id. at 4 (defining "impartiality").
Abramson, supra note 61, at 5o n.2 ("Whether a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned is also rnferred to as the appearance of partiality, the
appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances.").
6 7 See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1989).
68 See, e.g., In re Lieb, 112 B.R. 830, 837 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
lih

66
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cases, the motion for recusal was never transferred to another
judge or panel of judges; it was never briefed or argued in an
adversarial manner; and, if it was appealed, it was reviewed by an
appellate court in a highly deferential manner and, ultimately,
upheld. 69 And it is no surprise that such disparate cases, from
such disparate courts scattered throughout the nation, involved
the same recusal procedure because the self-recusal procedure is
in fact used in most courts throughout the United States, just as it
has been for over two centuries.
Not only has the recusal procedure remained the same, but it
has also remained largely ignored. 7 0 Neither the federal recusal
statutes, nor the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, address
what procedure should be followed when a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. Courts, too, have largely turned a
deaf ear to academia's call for procedural reform.
What we do know about recusal procedure can be
summarized quickly: when recusal is required under one of the
federal statutes, the Codes of Judicial Conduct, or the
Constitution, the judge must recuse sua sponte, without awaiting
a party's request that he do so. 11 Often, this is precisely what
happens, with judges stepping aside before any party files a
motion seeking recusal. 72 This self-enforcing scheme is absolutely

69 Many of these recusal decisions were never appealed because, for the reasons
discussed later, the likelihood of success on appeal of a recusal ruling is small.
70 Although the courts have largely ignored the recusal procedure, academic
literature critical of self-recusal has been picking up steam. This literature is
summarized in Part I.A. But there is little evidence that this growing body of literattire
has had much effect in eradicating self-recusal, or convincing judges as to the
procedure's problems.
71 United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ection 455 is self·
executing, requiring the judge to disqualify himself for personal bias even in the
absence of a party complaint."); see also Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 675 & n.96
(citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989)).
n For example, federal judges are required to maintain a list of companies in
which they have a financial interest, and when litigation involving one of those
companies comes in front of the court, the judge will not even be assigned to the case.
When the judge chooses to step aside, the litigants and the public are often unaware of
the recusal decision because the case might simply be re·assigned to a new judge. Even
when the public is aware of the judge's recusal decision, the judge's reasons for recusal
may not he known. Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for
Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v.
United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 195 (2005) ("{T]ypically, no reasons
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essential because the parties are often unaware of the judge's
disqualifying interest. 73 Of course, when the judge steps aside on
his own initiative, there are no constitutional problems. 1 4 And
many judges, out of an abundance of caution, will recuse
themselves even without a motion by either party.75
If a judge does not step down on her own initiative, a party
must seek disqualification by filing a recusal motion with the
court, supported by proper evidence. 76 The challenged judge then
decides whether to grant the motion based on her own review of
the motion and the supporting documentation.77 If the judge
are given for a Justice's nonparticipation, even if it is known that a Justice recused
himself in a case ....").
7a Judges have a duty to disclose any information they believe that the litigants
might consider relevant. This obligation exists even if the judge does not believe the
information requires disqualification. Blaisdell v. Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390-91
(N.H. 1992). Although this requirement theoretically allows litigants to learn
potentially disqualifying information, this obligation has little practical effect. Even if
the judge discloses some relevant information, it is ultimately still up to the same judge
to decide whether recusal is warranted. But at this stage, the judge has already made
the decision that there is no basis for disqualification, despite the fact that the parties
or their counsel might consider the information relevant.
7< Some scholars have expressed concern that judges who step aside when not
required to do so may be shirking their judicial duties. See, e.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens,
In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007) (arguing that the current
approach to recusal encourages over-recusal). However, the "duty to sit" doctrine,
which required the judges to remain on the cases unless they were absolutely required
to recuse, has long been eliminated. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The
Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (2009)
(discussing the "duty to sit" doctrine and its demise).
75 The author has talked to many judges who have explained that that is precisely
their approach to recusal questions. Even if they believe that recusal is not warranted
by the facts, they prefer to step aside and let a colleague take over to avoid any
potential controversy in the future.
70 Some jurisdictions require the motion to be supported by a written brief,
affidavits, oral testimony, transcript from an earlier proceeding, or some combination
of these. Litigants must also comply with the state's timeliness and specificity
requirements. All of these requirements vary from state to state, and often courts have
the discretion to waive these procedural requirements. See FLAMM, supra note 16, at
669-822 (surveying rules in state and federal courts).
77 See id. at 498 ("In the absence of some disability on the part of the challenged
judge, the question of whether such a motion is legally sufficient to warrant the
requested relief is one that is ordinarily addressed, in the first instance, to the personal
conscience and sound discretion of the judge whose disqualification is being sought.")
(footnotes omitted). Most jurisdictions require that the party moving for
disqualification show cause. Nineteen states provide for peremptory challenges for trial
judges, similar to the provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 144. See ABA Judicial Disqualification
Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously, 92 JUDICA'l'URE 12, 15 n.39 (2008). States
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concludes that the movant has demonstrated good cause for
recusal, the judge is required to step aside. If not, the judge is free
to remain on the case, unless an appellate court reverses the
judge's decision or issues a writ of mandamus disqualifying the
judge.78 Ultimately, the decision whether to recuse rests solely in
the hands of the judge whose impartiality is under attack-the
very judge who is alleged to harbor bias against the moving party,
or in favor of its opponent, or both. As a result, the person with
the biggest stake in the outcome of the recusal decision is the one
who decides whether to recuse.
Treating a motion for recusal like any other motion ignores
the fact that disqualification motions are different from any other
motion a lawyer might file in the course of litigation. Unlike, say,
a discovery motion, or a motion for summary judgment, a lawyer
asking a judge to step aside calls into question the fairness,
impartiality, and often even the integrity, of the challenged judge.
It is also the only motion that requires the judge to examine, and
rule on, his own conduct rather than the conduct of the lawyers or
the parties appearing before him.
We know little about when and how the self-recusal
procedure came into existence; there are no records showing the
first use of self-recusal, or any positive law establishing self
recusal as the norm. But this recusal procedure has become so
entrenched in our legal fabric that when state courts try to shift
away from self-recusal, it becomes a contested, and highly
contentious, issue. The changes to recusal procedures at the
Michigan Supreme Court offer a great example. In 2009, the
Michigan Supreme Court responded to the United States Supreme
Court's Caperton decision by amending its court rules to permit
the entire court to hear a party's disqualification motion if the
challenged judge denied the motion in the first instance. 79 In a

that do provide for peremptory challenges take different approaches to how those
challenges are reviewed. The peremptory challenge procedure is outside the scope of
this paper, except insofar as it is one possible alternative that I suggest other state and
federal courts that currently provide for self-recusal should consider adopting.
7a For a summary of appellate procedure for recusal decisions, seo FLAMM, .5Upra
note 16, at 959.
79 MICH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b). Prior to tho change, the Michigan Supreme Court's
recusal procedure was identical to that of the United States Supreme Court, and that
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bitter dissent from the Court's announcement of the procedural
change, Justice Corrigan, on behalf of three justices, accused the
four-justice majority of curtailing the fundamental freedoms of
state judges and "depriv[ing] their co-equal peers of their
constitutionally protected interest in hearing cases."BO In other
words, according to the three dissenting justices, deviation from
self-recusal is not just bad policy, but is itself unconstitutional. It
is not often that a procedural change to court rules evokes such
passionate dissents from judges or justices, but abandoning self
recusal triggered just such a reaction. More recently, Wisconsin
had a similar, and similarly bitter, experience when the Wisconsin
Supreme Court also considered revisions to its recusal
procedures.8 1
Why did self-recusal become such an entrenched part of our
recusal jurisprudence? Although there is little historical evidence,
we can gleam at least part of the answer by examining some of the
factual assumptions underlying self-recusal. At common law, it
was presumed that judges, upon their elevation to the position,
shed any personal biases, simply casting those prejudices aside to
do their job.82 This view was encapsulated by William Blackstone,
who, in his famous Commentaries, explained that "the law will not
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already
sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly
depends upon that presumption and idea."83
American judges accepted this notion without a critical
examination. For example, Maine's Supreme Judicial Court
explained in an early case that "[iJn addition to their legal
learning, judges are presumably selected because of their ability
to lay aside personal prejudices and to hold the scales of justice

of nearly all the other state ~upreme courts. That i;;, each justice was in charge of his or
her own reeusal motion, without any oversight by his or her colleagues.
114 MICH. CT. R. 2.003 cmt.; see also Richard E. Flamm, The History of Judicial
Disqualification in America, JUDGES' J., Summer 2013, at 12, 14 (discussing the debate
over changes to Michigan's rule).
8t See Jessica M. Karmasck, Report: Wis. SC Justices Torn Over Possible New
Recusal Rules, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 16, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/
news/240898·report·wis· sC· j ustice;;-tom-over-possi blc- new- recu;;al-rules.
8• See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-12 (1947)
(explaining the common law understanding of judicial bias).
L<I 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
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evenly. The presumption is that they will do so."84 Or, as one
commentator (facetiously?) put it,
[t]he judge is considered a distinctly superior being with an
olympian detachment enabling him to shake the bonds of
preconception and environment that shackle the judgments of
ordinary men. He is capable of impartial justice even though
convinced of the guilt of the accused, or even though required
to judge between his warm friend and his bitter enemy.85
A similar view of judges' ability to set aside personal
prejudices appears in a number of early judicial opinions as well
as early literature on judging.SS
These
attitudes
towards
judicial
infallibility
and
presumptions of impartiality have laid the foundation for the
acceptance, at least by the judiciary, of self-recusal. If the judge,
upon ascending to the bench, is truly capable of shutting off her
personal bias like a switch, then giving the judge discretion to
decide whether she is too biased in favor of one party makes good
sense, as does the presumption that the judge is not biased. But as
this Article shows, such assumptions can no longer be tolerated
given our understanding of judicial decision-making and cognitive
biases.
There is another important reason for the common law's
acceptance of self-recusal. As explained earlier, under the common
law, recusal was only required if a judge had a pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the litigation. So long as the judge did not have a
"direct financial interest" in the case, he could hear the case. 87
Recusal for bias was not required, either under then-existing
recusal statutes, or under then-existing understanding of the Due
Process Clause. For example, judges could hear cases involving
family members, even close family members, as litigants.ss The
common law substantive standard helped shape the common law
Bond v. Bond, 141 A. 833, 836 (Me. 1928).
Note, Disqualification of Judges by Peremptory Challenge, 47 YALE L.J. 1403,
1403 (1938).
6• State v. Cole, 15 P.2d 452, 452-53 (Kan. 1932); In re Cameron, 151 S.W. 64, 74
(Tenn. 1912); Leonard v. Willcox, 142 A. 762, 771 (Vt. 1928).
67 See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at 1223.
68 Brookes v. Earl of Rivers, (1668) 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.) (holding that a judge
was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law's case).
84
•5
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recusal procedure because under such a narrow substantive
standard, it is much easier to identify when a pecuniary interest
in the outcome of a case might exist. Identifying such a pecuniary
interest does not require the kind of introspective analysis that is
mandated by the modern recusal standards, or the current
understanding of due process. The self-recusal procedure was well
tailored for that objective substantive test. But once the
substantive test evolved, recusal procedures should have followed
suit. They didn't.

II. JUDTCTAL IMPARTIALITY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
In this section, I will discuss the application of the Due
Process Clause in the context of judicial impartiality and judicial
recusal. Although there is little Supreme Court case law on
point,s9 the role of judicial impartiality under the United States
Constitution is clear: due process guarantees the right to a fair
trial, which in turn requires the presence of an impartial arbiter
a fair, neutral judge. As Justice Holmes stated nearly a century
ago, "{w]hatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the
phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it embraces
the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be
heard."90 Especially in an adversarial system like ours, where
both parties are expected to vigorously present their own cases
from their own individualized perspective, judges must remain
impartial to produce a fair result. After all, other procedural
protections, such as those provided by the rules of evidence, are of
little value if the judge is partial in favor of one of the litigants.91
89 And none of the Supreme Court's decisions directly address the question of
recusal procedure. This requires that we apply the Supreme Court's analysis in a
somewhat new context. Nonetheless, given that the Supreme Court follows the same
recusal procedure that is the subject of this Article-namely, self-recusal~we can infer
that the Supreme Court does not consider the self-recusal procedure in violation of the
Due Process Clause. For more discussion of this issue, and my response to this
argument in favor of sclf-recusal's constitutionality, sec Part III.C.
00 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9 ' The term "impartiality" is one that eludes an easy definition. As mentioned
earlier, many "non-legal" factors influence judicial decisions, including the judge's
family, upbringing, number and sex of children, and political leanings. See supra notes
11-14 and accompanying text. Thus, a requirement that the judge remain impartial
does not mean that the judge's mind was a complete tabula rasa. Certain
preconceptions about the law, for example, are not just tolerated but expected of judges
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In fact, the Court has hinted that even the appearance of
impartiality may fall within the confines of the Due Process
Clause.92 I will begin by discussing the key cases establishing the
right to a fair and impartial tribunal, and then I will discuss the
less established, but not less important, right to a judge that
appears impartial.

A. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw."93 The Fifth
Amendment imposes identical obligations on the federal
government.94 'l'he meaning of this provision has been subject to
considerable debate in our nation's history. The Supreme Court, at
various points in its history, has interpreted the clause to protect
a number of substantive freedoms, from economic rights95 to
privacy rights.96 But while there is considerable disagreement
within the judiciary (and the academy) about the meaning of the
clause, and the validity of substantive due process as a theory of
constitutional interpretation,97 there is little dispute that the Due
Process Clause guarantees to each person an impartial tribunal in
all legal proceedings, and in all phases of a legal proceeding.
Importantly, the right to a fair judge did not originate in the
Constitution. Scholars have traced the due process right as far
back as the Magna Carta.98 The importance of an impartial
decisionmaker has been recognized in "the Old Testament, the
Code of Justinian, and Shakespeare's Henry VIIJ."99 The United
States Constitution enshrines judicial independence and judicial
who must be learned in the law before taking the bench. See, e.g., Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002) ("Judges of the supreme court, the court of
appeals and the district court shall be learned in the law." (quoting MINN. CONST. art.
VT, § 5)).

u See infra Part 111.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
96 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1978).
91
See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALEL.J. 408, 509-11 {2010).
98 See Serbulea, supra note 3, at 1110.
•• Frost, supra note 51, at 565 (footnotes omitted).
93
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impartiality as two of its central values by including a number of
structural protections to ensure that judges are not conflicted
when deciding disputes between two litigants.ioo As the Court has
explained on numerous occasions, "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process."101 Judicial impartiality "is a
sine qua non of procedural due process."102 And on the flip side,
the presence of a biased judge violates due process.103
Despite the apparent breadth of the doctrine, and the
Supreme Court's soaring rhetoric, there are few decisions finding
that lower-court judges were unconstitutionally biased. The Court
has applied the Due Process Clause to reverse a lower court
judgment in only four distinct situations:
1.

When the judge was paid a salary from the fines he
collected from defendants appearing before him.104

2.

When the judge presided over a contempt proceeding
against defendants who had allegedly committed
contempt toward the judge m a separate
proceeding. 105

3.

When the judge participated in a decision that had a
direct effect on a different but substantively related
lawsuit to which the judge himself was a party.106

4.

When the judge participated in a case in which one of
the parties substantially supported the judge's
campaign for office.107

100 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 (establishing life tenure and undiminished salaries for
federal judges); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
101
See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
10 '
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986).
103 See Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he cornerstone of the
American judicial system is the right to a fair and impartial process. Therefore, any
judicial officer incapable of presiding in such a manner violates the due process rights
of the party who suffers the resulting effects of that ... bias.") (citation omitted).
104 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522·23 (1927).
105 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135~36.
ios Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824·25 (1986).
107 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886-87, 889-90 (2009).
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The leading decision that helped shape the meaning of the
Due Process Clause in the recusal context is Tumey v. Ohio. IOB
There, a judge received his income solely from the fines he
recovered from his convictions, but received no additional benefits
when the defendant was acquitted.109 Not surprisingly, the judge's
conviction rate was quite high, and one defendant appealed.HO
The Supreme Court reversed the appellant's sentence, holding
that a judge may not have such a direct, personal, and substantial
interest in convicting defendants.111 The Court explained that
[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof ... or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due
process of law. 112
Notice the Court's language: "every procedure." Although the
decision itself was about the substantive recusal standard
contained within the Due Process Clause, the Court's phrasing
suggests that when it comes to recusal, substance and procedure
are not subject to a neat separation. The Tumey decision was
reaffirmed, and to some degree extended, in Ward v. Village of
Monroeville. 11 3 There, the Court held that the judge did not need a
direct financial interest in order to violate due process.114 Rather,
a violation of due process can occur even when the judge-mayor's
salary does not depend on his conviction rate, if the fines assessed
went towards increasing the town's budget.115
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie is another example of a
financial incentive that might lead a judge, in the words of the
Court, "not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."116 In Aetna, a
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of the

273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 520.
110 Id. at 521.
111 Id. at 535.
113 Id. at 532.
113 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
IL< Id. at 60.
ll5
Id.
116 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S.
at 532).
108
109
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plaintiff on his bad faith claim against the defendant insurance
company.111 Unbeknownst to the defendants, that same justice
had filed two nearly identical actions against other insurance
companies making similar allegations.us Those cases were still
pending in Alabama's lower courts at the time the Aetna case was
decided.119 The justice's decision, then, had the effect of creating
precedent favorable to the justice's own claim.120 Reversing the
Court's decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
justice's failure to recuse violated the Due Process Clause.121 The
Court explained the opportunity to further his own financial
interests could "lead [the justice] not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true,"122 thus allowing the justice to act as "a judge in
his own case."123 Establishing favorable precedent for his own
litigation creates too much incentive for the judge to decide the
case not according to its merits, but according to the judge's
personal preference.
The most recent, and perhaps the most famous, case
exploring the intersection of recusal and due process is Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.124 In Caperton, newly-elected West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding
vote in favor of Massey to overturn a $50 million lower-court
judgment.125 It turned out, however, the Massey's CEO, Don
Blankenship, was an extremely generous supporter of Justice
Benjamin in the previous West Virginia Supreme Court election
campaign.126 In fact, Blankenship had contributed more to
Benjamin's campaign than all other donors combined. 121 To make
matters worse, the campaign and the contributions all happened

tl]

Id.at817.

Id.
Id.
l2()
Id.
121 Id.
m Id.
1~ Id.
118

817-18.
822.
825.
825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
824 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see al8a Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 561, 579 (1973) (holding that an administrative board made up of
optometrists were disqualified from presiding over a hearing against competing
optometrists}.
m 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
12.5 Id. at 874.
126 Id. at 873.
119

121

Id.

at
at
at
at
at
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while Massey's lawyers were preparing the Caperton case for an
appeal.128 After Caperton asked Justice Benjamin to recuse
himself, Benjamin refused and voted with the majority in a 3-2
decision overturning the trial court's verdict. 12 9 But the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Justice Benjamin's
non-recusal violated Caperton's due process right to a fair and
impartial judge.130 Although it remains to be seen whether
Caperton will change the way that states approach judicial
recusal, Caperton leaves no doubt that recusal can be required
under the Due Process Clause even when the judge has no
personal financial stake in the outcome of the litigation.131
There are some lesser cases defining the parameters of due
process and judicial impartiality, but the few cases discussed
above are the Court's most important pronouncements on the
subject. One of the reasons for the dearth of cases is due to the
fact that Congress and the states have imposed recusal standards
that are more rigorous than those imposed by the Due Process
Clause. 1 3 2 As a result, before judges can cross the constitutional
threshold, they must already have crossed the statutory and
1•s Id. Blankenship spent approximately $3 million of his own money in support of
Justice Benjamin's election. Id. Most of that money funded a tax-exempt organization,
And For The Sake Of The Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice
McGraw. Id. In addition, Blankenship funded newspaper and television advertising
attacking McGraw. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22).
129 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-74. The case's long history and factual background is
not relevant for the purposes of this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal
played a prominent role in the case's procedural history. After Benjamin cast the
deciding vote in the original appeal, Blankenship's relationship with yet another
justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court drew substantial public attention when
photographs showing Blankenship and Justice Elliott Maynard vacationing together on
the French Riviera. See John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal, A.RA. J., Feb. 2009, at 52, 56,
auailable at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/artide/capertons_coal/. As a result of
the controversy, Justice Maynard recused himself from the case. Id. At around the
same time, Justice Larry Starcher, a critic of Massey and Blankenship, also recused
himself from a separate case involving Massey. Id.
130 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886-87.
131 However, studies continue to show that judges are more likely to recuse
themselves in cases involving a financial interest than in cases involving a non
financial bias. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFIC/\.TJON: AN EMPJIUCAL STUDY OP JUDlCIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 1

(1995).
m

See supra Part I.B (discussing ethical and statutory standards for judicial

disqualification).
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ethical lines. Nonetheless, with relevant decisions coming
approximately thirty years apart, scholars have long thought that
the Constitution mandates disqualification in only very limited
circumstances when the judge has engaged in outrageous conduct.
The Supreme Court has explained that "matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion" rather
than a constitutional recusal floor.133 According to the Court,
"[t]he Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications."134
Within those boundaries, this is an area of law where bright
lines are particularly difficult to draw. It is easy to proclaim that a
judge cannot be "too biased," but identifying the specific
circumstances when the judge is not sufficiently impartial is a
challenge.135 However, the few Supreme Court decisions we have
can help us deduce some standards that can help assess the
constitutionality of the self-recusal procedure. For example, the
Court has made clear that due process requires that a judge "must
be sufficiently free of predisposition to be able to render an
impartial decision in it."136 The Court has also explained that due
process precludes more than judges with a pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case. Rather, the judge must not have
prejudged the issues in the case, and must not be biased in favor
of or against either party.137 'I'herefore, unlike the common law
recusal standard, due process requires that all surrounding
circumstances and relationships be considered.138
From this limited case law, we can draw the constitutional
tests that can help us decide when a judge is not sufficiently
impartial. There are two key tests. First, "no man can be a judge
in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has
an interest in the outcome." 1 39 This common-law maxim underpins

133

Tumey v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va.

266, 270 (W. Va. 1884)).

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
This is an extremely difficult question, but it is a question of the appropriate
substantive standard, not of the proper recusal procedure to identify such bias.
1311 FLAMM, supra note 16, at 34.
1 1
s Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76 (2002).
138 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
Ll9
Jd.
1

3<
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the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the scope of due process.140
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that was invoked by
Blackstone141 in his famous Commentaries, as well as by Madison
in Federalist No. 10.142 It is a principle with deep roots in
American history, as well as Anglo-American jurisprudence.143 It
is also a principle that has been frequently invoked by the United
States Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts to
prohibit judges from presiding over matters in which the judge is
personally involved 144 or in which he is an active participant.145
Thus, any procedure that allows a judge to act as a judge in his
own cause violates the constitutional mandate.
Second, constitutional due process concerns arise when the
circumstances would tempt the average judge "not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true."146 This test, too, defies an easy
application, but can serve as a reminder that even the probability
of unfairness-remember, only a showing that the average judge
would be tempted is required--can rise to the level of a
constitutional violation without proof of actual bias.147 Under this
test, the focus is on temptation: would an average judge be unable
uo This principle is originally derived from Sir Edward Coke's famous decision in
Dr. Bonham's Case. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
141
l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 ("[l]t is unreasonable that any man
should determine his own quarrel.").
iu THE FEDERALT8T No. 10 (James Madison) ("No man is allowed to be a judge in
his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity.").
14
~ See PauJ R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of
independence, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 301, 305-07 (1989); see also Adrian Vermeule,
Contra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384 (2012)
(discussing the history of the "no man should be a judge in his own case" maxim, and
describing it as the "bedrock principle of natural justice and constitutionalism").
144 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) (mandating recusal when the
judge became "personally embroiled" with one of the parties).
145 See United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987). For
example, in Harrison v. McBride, 428 F.3d 652, 670 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh
Circuit held that a judge's "desire to vindicate his name directed his actions and
clouded his reasoning." In other words, the judge's interest in protecting his reputation
rendered the judge insufficiently impartial and therefore tainted the trial over which
he was presiding.
146 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
141 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that because "[a] fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" the judiciary "has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness").
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to approach the question at issue neutrally, without being enticed
to rule in favor or against a party for reasons unrelated to the
legal merits of the party's position. For the reasons discussed in
Part III, this Article concludes that the self-recusal procedure fails
both tests.
Admittedly, many of the key cases interpreting the Due
Process Clause have arisen in the criminal context, where the
presence of a biased judge is particularly repugnant to due process
when a person's liberty is at stake. But the due process guarantee
applies in both civil and criminal matters, so any conclusions as to
the constitutionality of self-recusal will apply in all cases where
the procedure is followed. 14 S And not only is the right to an
impartial decisionmaker guaranteed in every type of proceeding, it
is also a right applicable to every stage of a proceeding. Thus,
nothing in the Court's jurisprudence suggests that disqualification
proceedings are exempted from the protections of the Due Process
Clause, or do not require an impartial arbiter.149
Of course, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on due process
and recusal does not address the issue of the recusal procedure
itself. The Supreme Court's recusal procedures have never been
challenged, and the Supreme Court has never questioned the
constitutionality of the recusal procedures either at the Supreme
Court or any state or lower federal courts. In fact, not once have
litigants even raised concerns about the constitutionality of the
self-recusal procedure in front of the Supreme Court, focusing
instead on the actual (non) recusal decisions made by state and
lower federal court judges.150 Thus, all of the cases finding due
process violations deal with the actual decisions that judges reach
using the current self-recusal scheme, without touching on the
issue of who gets to decide whether recusal is required. But that
us Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
149 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions discussed above rest upon the assumption
that the Due Process Clause applies to motions for recusal. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof ... denies the latter due
process of law.") (emphasis added).
150 A recent cert petition to the United States Supreme Court raised the issue
tangentially. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, Hill v. Schilling, 133 S. Ct. 2859
(2013) (No. 12-1258). The petition argued that "[t]he most significant impediment to a
truly impartial judiciary is challenged judges having unbridled discretion over their
own recusal decisions." Id. However, the Supreme Court denied cert in the case.
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question-who decides?-is just as important as the question of
what the decision must be. In fact, often times the answer to the
former question will forecast the answer to the latter. Here, the
Court's reasoning is instructive, and the common-law concepts the
Court has announced offer us some guidance in assessing the
constitutionality of recusal procedure. And the Court's focus on
the importance of judicial impartiality helps us frame the
discussion in Part III as to whether the self-recusal procedure can
be consistent with due process.

B. Due Process and Appearance of Bias
Before moving on to Part III, there is one outstanding issue
concerning the scope of the Due Process Clause. While there is no
doubt that due process requires a fair and impartial judge, courts
have at times suggested that due process requires more: that, in
addition to actually being fair and impartial, a judge must also
appear to be fair and impartial. That is, judges must be viewed by
the participants in the legal system and by the public as unbiased.
Of course, this requirement is contained in the canons of judicial
ethics.151 But the Court has also hinted that this requirement is a
component of due process. In Murchison, the Supreme Court
famously stated that it is not enough for a procedure to result in a
fair decision; "to perform its high function in the best way, 'justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice."'15 2 And in Peters v. Kif{,
the Court reiterated that "even if there is no showing of actual
bias in the tribunal, ... due process is denied by circumstances
that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias."153 And the
Court has continually stressed that public confidence in the
judiciary is essential in a constitutional democracy.154 Even

1• 1

162

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 2, 4 (2007).
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14

(1954)).

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).
Marshall v. Jerrica, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (explaining that the public's
confidence in judicial impartiality must be "jealously guarded"). As Debra Lyn Bassett
observed, "(j]udicial decisions rendered under circumstances suggesting bias or
favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine the integrity of the courts, and
generally thwart the principles upon which our jurisprudential system is based."
Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 662 (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JumCTAL
DISQUALIFICATfON: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES§ 5.4.1, at 150 (1996)).
L53

t54

1166

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

{VOL. 84:5

outside the recusal context, the Court has frequently stressed the
dignity component that attends due process of law, and "the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has
been done."155
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never truly explained
what it meant by the "appearance of justice" and there is no
Supreme Court case law interpreting and applying the
appearance-based test in the due process context. For example,
not once has the court held that a judge's or justice's failure to
recuse violated due process solely because of the appearance of
impartiality. Most recently, Caperton v. Massey raised a similar
issue and offered the Supreme Court another chance to answer
this important question, but the Court failed to provide definitive
guidance.us Justice Benjamin, the West Virginia Supreme Court
justice who was asked to recuse, took the position that due process
does not require recusal based solely on the appearance of bias.157
Initially, that was the issue on which the Supreme Court granted
cert, but somewhere along the way Caperton changed its focus
from appearances to probabilities. When the case was finally
decided, the Court did not address the appearance claim, focusing
instead on the judge's probability of bias.158
Thus, while the Court has consistently reiterated that the
appearance of fairness is important to the judiciary, and is

m See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
m Dmitry Barn, Understanding Caperton; Judicial Disqualification Under the Due
Process Clause, 42 McG80HGJ<: L. RRV. 65, 73-75 (2010).
151 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 295 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin,
C .J., concurring).
168 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882-84 (2009). Some have
interpreted the Caperton opinion as holding that the appearance of impartiality
violates the Due Process Clause. See Gerard J. Clark, Caperton's New Right to
lnde.pendence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 707 (2010) ("The Court's due process
standard, however, is really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and
judicial codes."); see also Joan Biskupic, Court: Judges Must Avoid Appearance of Bias,
USA TODAY (June 8,
2009,
10:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washingt.Qnljudicial/2009-06-08-supreme-court-judge_N.htm; Demise of Judicial
Elections and Lessons from the Lonestar State, CHOOSE JUDGES ON MERIT (Feb. 18,
2010, 8:19 PM), http://judgesonmerit.org/2010/02/18/demise-of-judicial-elections-and
lessons-from-the-lonestar-state/ ("Caperton plainly lays out that even the appearance of
impartiality due to large campaign contributions may violate due process.").
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perhaps required by the Due Process Clause,159 the Court's
holdings are at best inconclusive as the appearance language
generally appears in dicta. But the Court's opaqueness has not
stopped the lower courts from speculating about the role of
appearances. Indeed, some lower courts have held that
appearances are a crucial part of the Due Process Clause. For
example, in Allen v. Rutledge, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that "[d]ue process requires not only that a judge be fair, but that
he also appear to be fair." 160 The Ninth Circuit, too, has held that
due process "is concerned not only with actual bias but also with
'the appearance of justice."'16 1 Other courts have disagreed. For
example, in State v. Canales, the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that "a judge's failure to disqualify himself or herself will
implicate the due process clause only when the right to
disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that
judge."162
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, and the
divergent decisions from the lower courts, has left scholars
questioning whether appearances have any role to play in
interpreting the scope of the Due Process Clause. J63 So long as the
complaining party receives a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal,
the argument goes, why should it matter that the proceeding
appeared to be unfair, or that the judge appeared to be biased?164
The answer lies in the fact that the appearance-based prong of the
Due Process Clause is important to "maintain public trust and

See, e.g., Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 ("The neutrality requirement .... preserves
both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important t.o a
popular government, that justice has been done."' quoting McGrath, 34 l U.S. at 172)).
100 Allen v. Rutledge, 139 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark. 2003) (disqualifying a judge for
appearance-based reasons); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 798 (Okla. 2001)
("The High Court has explained that the reach of due process jurisprudence requires
not only a fair tribunal, but also the appearance of a fair tribunal.").
1s1 Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
••• State v. Canales, 916 A.2d 7S7, 781 (Conn. 2007); see also Cowan v. Bel. of
Comrn'rs, 148 P.3d 1247, 1260 (Idaho 2006) ("[Wle require a showing of actual bias
before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant maintains a decision maker
has deprived the proceedings of the appearance of fairness.").
•63 See Cravens, supra note 74, at 12 (arguing that recusal standards should focus
not on appearance of bias, but rather evidence of actual bias).
' 64 See id. at 11-13.
159
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confidence in the judiciary." 165 Appearances are particularly
important to the judiciary. As discussed earlier, the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, as well as the federal disqualification statutes,
focus on appearances because public confidence in the courts is
preserved only when judges appear to act impartially.166 And the
requirement of judicial impartiality is intended to produce more
than just a fair trial; it is designed to promote the public's
confidence in the judiciary.167 Such confidence gives the judiciary
the institutional legitimacy to make unpopular rulings that are
enforced by the other branches of government, and that the public
complies with despite disagreement.rns An appearance-based
recusal standard assures the public that impartiality is taken
seriously by the courts.169
In fact, it is not so unusual for the Court to consider
appearances in deciding constitutional controversies. For example,
the Supreme Court's campaign-finance jurisprudence allows for
government regulation of speech (campaign contributions) because
of the government's interest in preventing not just corruption, but

Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. 2002).
See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts
in an Age of Indiuidual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: 'l'HE COLLISION
OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007) (explaining the
evolution of the American focus on disqualification for appearance of bias).
167 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); To Broaden and Clarify the
Grounds for Judicial Disqualification: Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on
lmprouements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 80 (1973)
(statement of Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Chairman, ABA Special Committee on Standards
of Judicial Conduct) ("It is not enough that people have confidence in the sturdiness of
judicial procedures. They must have utmost confidence in the integrity of their
judges.").
168 At least when it comes to the federal judiciary, such institutional legitimacy is
critical because judges am unelected and therefore, unlike many of their state
counterparts, are not accountable to voters for their decisions. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the courts have "no influence over either the
sword or the purse").
169 See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at 1245-46 ("[P]ublic confidence in the
judiciary docs not result from the judiciary's perception of impartiality; it results from
the public's perception of impartiality."); Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of
impropriety an Appropriate Standard for Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First
Century?, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 291 (2010) ("Avoiding not only impropriety, but also
the appearance of impropriety, is important for judges because public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is critical to the public's
willingness to accept judicial decision-making and submit to the rule of law.").
16&

166
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also the appearance of corruption.110 And appearances play an
important role in other areas of the law and politics. 171 But with
scant guidance from the Supreme Court, scholars and lower courts
have resorted to speculating about the role of appearances in due
process analysis. Thus, while this Article discusses the
constitutionality of self-recusal from an appearance-based
perspective,112 my focus remains on the Supreme Court case law
grounding the due process inquiry in bias rather than the mere
appearance of bias.

III. JUDGES IN THEIR OWN CASES
With an understanding of American recusal procedure and
its history, as well as the requirements of due process, we can
finally try to answer the key question this Article seeks to answer:
is the self-recusal procedure practiced throughout the United
States consistent with due process? This section will argue that
self-recusal does not and cannot ensure a judge is, or appears to
be, impartial. This section also addresses an obvious critique of
my argument: how can a practice that has been in place since the
founding (and long before that), a practice followed by the vast
majority of courts throughout the country (including the United
States Supreme Court), be unconstitutional?

A. Bias and Due Process
Because the case law on appearances is so limited and
inconclusive, let us assume that the Due Process Clause does not
protect the appearance of impartiality. Rather, this section
proceeds under the assumption that the Due Process Clause only
protects the non-controversial and well-established right to a fair
trial in front of a fair, impartial tribunal. Thus, rather than
focusing on the appearance of bias, we now turn our attention to

170 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that preventing
"corruption and the appearance of corruption" is a compelling governmental interest).
17 1 See generally Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1563 (2012) (describing the numerous instances of appearance·based
justifications in law and in politics).
112 See infra Part III.B.
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actual bias, or the probability of bias.173 Does the recusal
procedure satisfy that requirement? 'l'his Part concludes that self
recusal fails the impartiality test established by the Court, and
allows a judge to act as a judge in his own case.

1. Understanding Recusal Functionally
Deciding whether self-recusal satisfies due process requires,
at the outset, that we understand the nature of the party's motion
for disqualification. The motion challenges the judge's ability to
remain impartial, and suggests that the judge has engaged in
conduct that would lead a reasonable observer to question the
judge's impartiality. The recusal motion often criticizes the judge
for something that the judge has done. The motion frequently
claims that the judge will be unable to act impartially, a
requirement of the job of judging. Not surprisingly, most judges
hesitate to admit that they are so biased or so interested in a case
as to be unable to render a fair, impartial decision.174 Instead, the
judge's natural reaction is to deny-sometimes angrily deny-any
bias or prejudice. 1 75 In fact, the more biased the target judge is,
the less likely that judge is to recuse himself, because recusal
disables the judge from being able to rule in favor of the side
toward which he is predisposed, or against the side toward which
the judge harbors a bias.176
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
expecting an angered judge to act impartially is overly optimistic.
For example, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, the defendant had

m The Court has always been clear that the Due Process Clause does not require
proof of actual bias. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009)
("Under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when 'the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable."' (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); see
also id. at 887 (stating that recusal is required whenever there is an "unconstitutional
probability of bias"). Of course, the level at which a probability rises to "constitutional
intolerability" is the question, not the answer.
174 See Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 669.
m Id.
176 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (discussing the impact of cognitive
illusions and biases on the decision-making processes of judges).
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verbally attacked the presiding judge,177 and continuously
interrupted court, to the point where Mayberry had to be removed
from the courtroom.178 The Supreme Court held that when the
defendant faces criminal contempt charges, he "should be given a
public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the
contemnor." 17 9 The Court recognized that the judge who received
the defendant's wrath could not remain impartial, explaining that
a "vilified" judge "necessarily becomes embroiled in a running,
bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to
maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication." 1 so
Although the parties to the recusal proceedings are nominally
the litigants whose names appear on the caption, the recusal
proceeding is functionally a dispute between the movant and the
judge. The party challenging the judge's impartiality alleges that
the judge has an interest, a relationship, or some other bias that
will lead her to rule against the moving party. In response, the
judge either recuses, or denies the allegations. Either way, the
judge and the moving party are the two participants in the
disqualification dispute. In fact, the opposing party in the
underlying case often has no basis to respond to a recusal motion
because only the judge is aware of all the facts.181 The challenged
judge is "most familiar with his own conduct" and is often the only
one that can refute or deny the party's allegations.182 Thus, what
at first glance might appear to be a simple pre-trial motion, in fact
turns out to be a dispute involving the judge himself. While the
judge is "the most appropriate party to respond to a
disqualification motion ... the judge does not respond ... because
she is responsible for deciding the legal question of whether her
117 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). Defendant referred to the judge
as a "hatchet man for the State," a "dirty sonofabitch" and a "dirty, tyrannical old dog."
Id. at 456·57.
11s Id. at 462.
1 19 Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a
lawyer for contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity
to be heard in defense or mitigation. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499·501 (1974).
In such circumstances, a different judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of
the judge who initiated the contempt. id.
iso Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465.
10 1
See Frost, supra note 51, at 568.
' 92 Randall J. Littenckcr, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or
Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 266 (1978).
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conduct merits disqualification."183 Properly understood, then,
allowing the judge to review and decide his own recusal motion is
a perfect example of putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. Or,
in the language of the Due Process Clause, self-recusal allows a
judge to act as a "judge in his own cause."184
Of course, the judge is not formally a judge in his own case,
but that is not the end of the recusal inquiry. As explained earlier,
the Court has rejected such a formalistic approach to recusal in
favor of a more pragmatic test. For example, in Lavoie, the
Alabama Supreme Court case involving a justice who participated
in a case while at the same time being a party to a separate class
action that would benefit from the court's ruling, the justice was
not formally ruling in the case in which he was a party.185 Rather,
he was deciding a case that made his own claims stronger.186 But
the Supreme Court's functional opinion held that the opportunity
to develop favorable law could "lead [the justice in question] not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true." 1 87 The same functional
understanding should apply in the context of recusal procedure. A
judge addressing a motion calling for his recusal might have a
strong incentive to deny the motion either because he is actually
biased in favor of the other party and wants to decide the case in
their favor, or, perhaps more likely, because the judge does not
want to suggest that he erred by failing to recuse himself, as he
was required to do, before the recusal motion was filed.188 Either
way, the judge benefits from the decision not to recuse, even if
those benefits are intangible.
We also know that judges perceive that they have a stake in
the outcome of the recusal motion because of the judges' actions
when they are disqualified against their wishes. For example,
some judges, when disqualified by an appellate court, have fought
those disqualification decisions, even spending their own
"'
Frost, supra note 51, at 569.
m See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
is5 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 817 (1986).
iss Id. at 824.
187 Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
iss As discussed earlier, under the state Codes of Judicial Conduct, a judge must
recuse himself sua sponte. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, recusal in
response to a party's recusal motion may indicate that the judge acted improperly by
not recusing before the party's motion was filed.
1
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resources to seek reversal of their disqualification.189 This shows
that judges have some attachments to the cases that they are
assigned. Additionally, there may be a notion of professional pride
that attaches some stigma to being forced to recuse, either because
of an appellate court's decision, or because of a party's call for
recusaL In fact, a judge who grants a party's recusal motion is
arguably admitting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which requires the judge to recuse herself sua sponte. 190
Undoubtedly, the judge has a self interest in not admitting an
ethical violation.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, when Michigan changed
its recusal rules to allow for disqualification of state Supreme
Court justices by their colleagues, a number of justices dissented
and argued that they have a constitutional right to hear cases
assigned to them.191 Such complaints are unlikely to come from
someone with no vested interest in the resolution of the recusal
decision. Psychologists have also confirmed this intuition. Studies
show that people are subject to a status quo bias. This means that
people have a "tendency to stick with their current situation."1 s2
In the context of disqualification, the motion for recusal
necessarily comes after a judge has been assigned to the case,
which means that the status quo bias works against the grant of a
disqualification motion.
Perhaps most importantly, the preceding discussion in a way
assumes the presence of a judge who wants to remain fair and
impartial. If the judge truly is biased in favor of one side, then
that judge has an even greater interest in not recusing: recusal
eliminates the judge's opportunity to exercise his bias. For
example, in Caperton, the Supreme Court suggested that recusal
was necessary in part because Justice Benjamin might owe a
"debt of gratitude" to Massey's CEO for helping him win the

189 See generally Todd Lochner, Judicial Rem.ml and the Search for the Bright Line,
26 JUST. SYS. J. 231, 233 (2005) (describing the incident involving Judge Gertner and
her disqualification by the First Circuit).
190 "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ...." MODEL CODE o~· JumClAL
CONDUCT R. 2.ll(A) (2007).
1s1 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
is~ See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34 (2008) (discussing the status quo bias).
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judicial election.193 In such circumstances, the judge almost
certainly has a strong incentive not to recuse, for one of the best
ways for a judge to repay a debt of gratitude to a litigant is to rule
in the litigant's favor. Recusal thwarts that goal. Thus, whether
the judge is partial or impartial, she has a strong incentive not to
recuse, and cannot "hold the balance nice, clear and true."194
For elected judges-and nearly eighty percent of judges in
the United States are elected judges195-there is an additional
pressure not to recuse. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
the Supreme Court held that judges have the right to announce
their views on controversial issues, and many states even allow
judges to make promises to voters of how the judge will act while
in office.ms
If the judge, in the course of her campaign for office, does
make such promises, the judge has a strong incentive to rule in a
way consistent with those promises. Recusal eliminates the
judge's ability to do so. To make matters worse, if voters perceive
that the judge's promises are empty because the judge simply
recuses any time the issue on which the judge campaigned arises,
recusal will likely hurt the judge in the next election. And for a
judge who would like to retain his job,197 that is strong incentive
not to recuse in cases where recusal may be required.
The Supreme Court has never hinted that different
constitutional standards apply to the recusal proceeding. There is
no reason to think that would be the case. The recusal proceeding
is an important component of the litigation process, and it would
be arbitrary to single it out as the only part of the case that does
not require an impartial arbiter. In fact, courts have frequently
held that due process requires a fair and impartial judge at every

m Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2009).
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 5,'l2 (1927)).
195 See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (describing the growth and the prevalence
of judicial elections in the United States).
196 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
19 '
That group includes essentially every judge in the United States. See Richard A
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that judges are ordinary people who
seek to keep their jobs while minimizing their work).
19 '
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stage of the litigation, which presumably includes recusal.198
Therefore, so long as the recusal motion is a "proceeding" at which
due process applies, the party challenging the judge's impartiality
is entitled to an impartial arbiter to resolve that dispute, just as
an impartial judge is required to resolve a motion for summary
judgment or a pre-trial evidentiary motion.
The availability of appellate review is also insufficient to
remedy any constitutional violation.199 For the purposes of due
process, it is largely irrelevant that the decisions of a biased judge
are subject to eventual review by an appellate court.200 As the
Supreme Court has made clear, the possibility of appellate review
does not ameliorate defective procedures below. For example, in
England u. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,201 the
Court held that "such review, even when available by appeal
rather than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an
inadequate substitute" because "[l]imiting the litigant to review
[at the Supreme Court] would deny him the benefit of a federal
trial court's role in constructing a record and making fact findings.
How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of federal
claims." 202
In addition, appellate courts reviewing a trial court's denial
of a recusal motion apply a very deferential standard of review.
Generally, recusal decisions are reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.203 Not surprisingly, reversals of non-recusals are
exceedingly rare.204 To make matters worse, appellate review of
Supreme Court recusal decisions is unavailable, and while state
ias Redish & Marshall, supra note 102, at 503 n.180 (stating that an independent
adjudicator is required for all stages oftitigation).
199 Some courts have made the opposite argument. See McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal.
500, 500 (Cal. 1859) ("The province of a Judge is to decide such questions of law as may
arise in the progress of the trial. His decisions upon these points are not final; and if
erroneous, the party has his remedy by bill of exceptions and appeal.").
zoo Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) ("Nor, in any event, may
the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because
the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled
to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.").
•01 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
•oz Id. at 416.
203 See Stempel, supra note 17, at 755 (explaining that the deferential standards of
review used by most states and federal courts means that reversal of a non-recusal
decision on appeal is unusual).
• 04 Id. at 755-58.
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high court and federal circuit refusals to recuse are theoretically
appealable to the United States Supreme Court, such review is
extremely rare, and becoming even more so as the Supreme
Court's docket continues to shrink.205
2. Unconscious Bias and Self-Recusal
The constitutional objection could be blunted if judges indeed
had the ability to set aside their biases in considering recusal
motions. This, after all, was the historical basis for the self-recusal
procedure.206 But modern research in cognitive psychology has
recognized a number of biases that affect judicial decision-making
that are particularly relevant for recusal decisions, including
unconscious bias and self-serving bias.207 This research rebuts the
common-law assumptions that judges can assess their own
impartiality free of bias. Judges are human beings, and, like all
other humans, they suffer from cognitive biases that disable them
from assessing their own impartiality.2os This is true despite the
fact that our current recusal regime relies on an objective recusal
standard purportedly designed to eliminate the need for judges to
assess their own state of mind. It is true that the standards were
"implemented in an effort to make judicial disqualification
determinations less dependent on judicial caprice."209 But
imposing an objective disqualification standard is futile because,
regardless of the substantive test, judges must assess the objective
appearances of their own conduct. And the evidence is
overwhelming that this is an impossible task.

• 0•
See Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.cornJ2009/09/29/usJ29bar.html.
20• See supra Part I. C.
001 See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analy.5is: The
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Priuilege, 7 4 WASH. L.
REV. 913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the
Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight in.to Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 133, 143-80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias).
008 Similar cognitive constraints limit judges' ability to assess the conduct of their
friends or others with whom they identify. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Again.st the
Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1278-80
(2002) (discussing cognitive psychology literature and the effect of cognitive biases on
judicial decisionmaking).
209 FLAMM, supra note 16, at 105.
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Making the task impossible are the cognitive biases that
make people unable to assess their own conduct dispassionately
and open-mindedly. Scientists have long recognized that
"misperceptions or unconscious biases favoring beliefs,
recollections, or predictions about their own behavior consistent
with self-concept"210 may influence people's decisionmaking. We
all have a tendency to make decisions in a manner skewed to favor
our own self-interest.211 People are naturally convinced that our
"judgments are less susceptible to bias than the judgments of
others."212 Psychologists refer to this bias as the "Bias Blind
Spot."213 Understanding the Bias Blind Spot provides powerful
evidence that judges deciding their own disqualification motions
are unable to "hold the balance nice, clear, and true" in a way that
satisfies the requirements of due process.214
The Bias Blind Spot is best understood as a collection of
different cognitive biases that hinder people's self-assessment
abilities.2 1 5 Numerous studies reveal that people are poor at self
assessment because of self-enhancement motives. These biases
may go by different names in the psychological literature-self.
serving bias, egocentric bias, self-interest bias216-but they all
show the same thing: that people tend to think they are better
than they actually are at a number of different tasks and on a
number of different criteria. 21 7 Scientists have recognized that
people are inclined to see themselves in a positive light, ignoring

210 Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of
Financial Literacy Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. R8V. 415, 425-26 (2009) (citing MARK L.
MITCHELL & JANINAM. JOLLEY, RP.SEARCH D1':SlGN EXPLAINED 213-15 (6th ed. 2007)).
211
Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 567, 570 (2003).
2 12 Joyce Ehrlingcr, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Peering into the Bias Blind Spot:
People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PEH.SONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681 (2005).
m Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, 'l'he Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2002).
m Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
m See Ehrlinger et al., supra note 212, at 681.
216 See, e.g., Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot
Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 235, 250·53 (2013) (summarizing different biases that make up the Bias
Blind Spot).
211 Id.
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any objective evidence to the contrary.us For example,
psychologists have shown that people see themselves as more
ethical and fair than others. 219 And to make matters worse, we
refuse to acknowledge that these biases and interests affect our
decisions, despite the fact that most people recognize the presence
of such biases in others. 220 Experiments in behavioral economics
have also shown that these biases often lead people to irrationally
overlook flaws in their own behavior.22 1 All lawyers, judges
included, may be inclined to ignore or misinterpret the rules of
ethics when asked to judge themselves.222 As a result, judges
overestimate their ability to remain impartiaJ.223
Judges, of course, are subject to the same constraints.224
Although judges are rarely the subjects of these psychological
experiments, there is some evidence showing that judges, too, are
subject to the same Bias Blind Spot. For example, in one study,
researchers asked federal magistrate judges to estimate their rate
of reversal on appeal to their colleagues. Not surprisingly, nearly
ninety percent of judges rated themselves as less likely than the
average magistrate judge to be overturned on appeal.225 Even
casting the social science evidence aside, it is human nature to
believe oneself to be unbiased and fair, and judges, who are

its

See Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11

TRENDS IN COGNITIVE Ser. 37, 37-38 (2006).

rn See David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985).
m Pronin, supra note 218, at 37.
m See generally Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun

& Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in
Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996)
(discussing the operation of the self-serving bias in groups).
m See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 355 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000).
m See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden
Judiciary''.· An Empirical Examination of Executiue Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477,
1519-20 (2009).

""' See Guthrie et al., supra note 176, at 784-821 (explaining that judges suffer from
the same cognitive biases as laypersons); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in
the Courts: Ignorance or Adaption?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 99-100 (2000) ("Courts identify
cognitive illusions that might affect juries and adapt to them, but fail to identify
cognitive illusions that affect judges and fall prey to them.... [R]esearch indicates that
judges, like everyone else, are susceptible lo illusions of judgment.").
~; Guthrie et al., supra note 176, at 814. Obviously, by defmition, ninety percent of
judges cannot be better than average.
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expected to play the role of an "umpire,"226 are even more likely to
rationalize their opinions as objectively reasonable.
The confluence of these self-enhancement biases shows that,
in the recusal context, a judge assessing his own impartiality is
likely to conclude that he is not biased, and that no reasonable
observer could conclude that he is biased. As Judge Posner once
noted, judges "use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations
of bias, while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify
bias in others." 227 Admittedly, psychological processes and biases
can affect all judicial decision-making. But these self
enhancement biases and cogmtive biases are particularly
problematic when it comes to recusal because judges are asked to
assess their own conduct. And because judges by definition lack
awareness of their own unconscious biases, it is impossible for
them to take any action to eliminate such biases. 22 8

B. Appearance of Bias and Due Process
If we assume that due process mandates not just actual
impartiality, but also the appearance of impartiality, as the
Supreme Court has hinted and some lower courts have held, then
self-recusal is almost certainly at odds with the Due Process
Clause's mandate. Self-recusal undermines the appearance of
justice and the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary.
Justifying that conclusion is not easy. Many scholars and
judges have complained that an appearance-based standard is
simply too fuzzy and too vague to be judicially enforceable.229 They
have suggested that focusing on appearances, rather than actual
misconduct or impartiality, makes the inquiry too malleable and
subjective, without offering judges substantial guidance as to
what conduct creates such an appearance of bias or
220 Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2007)
(discussing the umpire metaphor invoked by Chief Justice Roberts and ,Justice Alito
during the hearings on their nominations to the United States Supreme Court).
227 RICHARD A. POSNER, How Junm;s THJNK 121 (2008).
••s See Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1996); Mah.zarin
R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments of
Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. P.SYCHOL. 181, 181 (1995).
2•9 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, .Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of impropriety, and
the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2006).
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impropriety.230 These arguments are not without merit, as it is
hard to define, with any kind of precision, what recusal procedures
are consistent with the appearance of impartiality. This may even
be one reason why the Supreme Court has been hesitant to give
appearances any bite in its due process decisions. And,
admittedly, with many judicial procedures, it would be a challenge
to conclude with any degree of certainty that the procedure
violates the appearance of impartiality. But the work of legal
process theorists over nearly a century has given us an adequate
foundation to reach some basic conclusions, especially when it
comes to recusal procedure.
First, political scientists have shown that when it comes to
appearances, procedural fairness is significantly more important
than substantive outcomes.231 'l'hrough the use of fair procedures,
the courts create the confidence in their own legitimacy.2a2 And
within the panoply of fair procedure, the one procedural element
more important than any other is the presence of a neutral and
impartial arbiter.233 As Tom Tyler has explained, the public's
evaluation of the judiciary is "especially influenced by evidence of
even-handedness, factuality, and the lack of bias or favoritism."234
Additionally, "[fJew situations more severely threaten trust in the
judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a
chance because the decisionmaker may have owed the other side
special favors."235 Each party must have confidence that it can
disqualify such a biased judge, but it is hard to imagine that a
party that perceives such a bias will be satisfied by the self
recusal procedure. In fact, as one scholar has argued, "[i]t is

Id. at 1340, 1342-43.
m See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
312, 314 (1997).
m Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and
Authorities, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGlTlMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 416, 422 (John T. Jost & Brenda
Major eds., 2001).
2ia See United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging
that an average layperson "is less likely to credit judges' impartiality than the
judiciary").
2 34 'l'yler, supra note 232, at 422.
235 Redish & Marshall, supra note 102, at 483.
2io
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doubtful that a party requesting disqualification is ever convinced
by a judge's own ruling that he is impartial."236
Legal process theorists have also demonstrated that a fair
procedure is one of the most important sources of judicial
legitimacy.23 7 Although the legal process literature is rich and
varied, one of the critical ingredients of procedural legitimacy is
that "disputes are presented through an adversarial system in
which two or more competing parties give their conflicting views"
to an impartial decisionmaker.238 Descriptively, this is, in fact,
how most disputes are handled by the judiciary, with recusal
being perhaps the biggest procedural exception. Only when it
comes to recusal procedure do we tolerate the presence of a
decisionmaker who is not neutral or impartial. This is an odd
exception because the presence of an impartial arbiter may be
more important in the context of recusal proceedings than at other
stages of litigation, not less. After all, these proceedings often
challenge the judge's character and integrity, probe the judge's
biases, and are at times very personal in nature.239 Judges facing
recusal motions are frequently angered by the motion, and
litigants fear they will exact revenge against the party seeking the
motion.240
Thus, if we take the Supreme Court at its word that due
process requires the judiciary not only to protect litigants from
bias but also to guarantee the appearance of impartiality, then our

2•• Seth E.
Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RP.S. L. Rl';V. 662, 697 (1985).
237 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THF. LEGAL PROCF!SS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
m Frost, supra note 51, at 555-56 (identifying the "five procedural components of
adjudication that are universally considered essential to the legitimacy of the final
product").
z~ 9 See Neumann, supra note 63, at 392 ('urhe case law is filled with descriptions of
defensive and angry judges denying motions that they recuse themselves. Judges in a
different courthouse, and perhaps in a distant city, are usually better able to sec the
situation in a disinterested way.").
HO See Nancy M. Olson, Judicial Elections and Courtroom Payola: A Look at the
Ethical Rules Gouerning Lawyers' Campaign Contributions and the Common Practice
of ''Anything Goes", 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL 'y & ETHICS J. 341, 365 (2010) (explaining
"litigants fear bringing valid recusal motions because they may anger judges, and
because the odds of success are extremely low''). For an example of a judge who found
the motion for his disqualification offensive, see Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 353 (7th
Cir. 1996).
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recusal procedure falls woefully short of satisfying that promise.
The bench, the bar, the academy, and other institutional actors
have spoken about commitment to the appearance of justice and
the appearance of impartiality. To the extent that these
commitments have a constitutional dimension, they require a
recusal procedure that creates such an appearance, and promotes
public confidence in the courts.2 41

C. Responding to the Historical Objection
But how can the self-recusal procedure be unconstitutional
when it has been practiced every single day in thousands of
courtrooms throughout the country? When the Supreme Court,
whose duty is to say what the law is,242 follows the same recusal
procedure?243 At the oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the
California Proposition 8 case, Justice Scalia used what the media
termed a "gotcha" question: he wanted to know when the
Constitution came to protect same-sex marriage.244 The intuition
behind the question is obvious. If same-sex marriage was banned
throughout the country at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, and that practice continued unabated since the
ratification of the Amendment, then how can it be that the
Fourteenth
Amendment
makes
same-sex
marriage
unconstitutional? Justice Scalia made a similar argument in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.245 Discussing the
m My proposals for recusal procedures that satisfy the appearance component of
due process are discussed in Part IV.
m Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("It is ... the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
243 The judicial supremacy debate is far outside the scope of this Article. For
challenges to judicial supremacy, sec LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing in favor of
popular constitutionalism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THK COURTS 6-32 (1999) (rejecting the notion of judicial supremacy). Other scholars
have argued in favor of judicial supremacy. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extra)udicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HAlW. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997);
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1981) (defending
judicial supremacy).
" 4
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144). Theodore Olson answered with a question of his own, asking
Justice Scalia when the Constitution came to bar public school segregation. Id.
20 • 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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constitutionality of judicial elections, Scalia explained that since
judicial elections have coexisted with the Due Process Clause since
at least 1840, when states had begun adopting judicial elections as
the method of choosing its judges, there can be no challenge to the
constitutionality of the practice.246
The same line of reasoning, with self-recusal taking the place
of same-sex marriage and judicial elections, forms perhaps the
strongest objection to the argument that self-recusal violates due
process. In other words, a critic of my conclusion would point out
that the recusal procedure is not only practiced by the Supreme
Court, which in our system has assumed the role of the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution, but has been practiced by the
Court since the time of the founding, so it has an impressive
historical pedigree. A practice which has coexisted with due
process for more than two centuries, the argument might go,
cannot be unconstitutional.
It is a strong argument, but I believe it fails on a number of
fronts. First, although self-recusal is admittedly practiced
throughout the country, the Supreme Court has never expressly
subjected recusal procedures to any kind of scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause. The Court's recusal procedure has never been
challenged. And the few constitutional challenges that have been
brought against the use of self-recusal by lower federal courts and
state courts have received only perfunctory review. Therefore, any
inference of constitutionality must come from Supreme Court
silence rather than from Supreme Court precedent.
Second, an unconstitutional procedure does not gain
constitutional legitimacy simply because of its lineage or historical
acceptance. The Court has frequently struck down statutes as
unconstitutional, despite past practice and even previous Supreme
Court approval.2 47 Here, the default recusal rule was arguably an

Id. at 780-84.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-96 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, and holding unconstitutional a practice that had been in existence since the
time of the founding); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(with the majority overturning the legislative veto as a violation of separation of
powers, despite the fact that the legislative veto was placed in over 200 separate laws
over a period of five decades).
~4s

m
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implementation of the rule of necessity.248 At the time of the
founding, finding a replacement judge was not a simple
proposition. Counties were far apart, and many had only a single
justice to hear disputes. This geographic limitation required
procedural rules that would allow cases to be heard quickly and
efficiently. Today, even in sparsely populated states, another
judge is never far away. Given improvements in travel, the rule of
necessity no longer provides an adequate justification for the self
recusal procedure.
Most importantly, American recusal practice is built on
certain foundational assumptions. As discussed above, the recusal
regime as it exists now came into being in England, with the
assumptions that judges could put aside their own bias, and that
due process required recusal only when the judge had a financial
interest in the outcome of the case. As Charles Geyh explains,
American "disqualification practice proceeds on two implicit
assumptions: that judges are able to assess the extent of their own
bias; and . . . how others reasonably perceive their conduct."249
And courts have traditionally presumed that judges can cast aside
their personal biases and beliefs in performing their judicial
duties.2so Whether this happens because of the solemn oath that
judges take,25 1 or because of special training,2 5 2 the self-recusal
procedure can only make sense if these core foundational
assumptions are true. Even a recusal procedure that was thought
to be constitutional can become unconstitutional if the factual
underpinning that supported that practice has been proven to be
erroneous.
Of course, we now know that these assumptions are wrong.
Blackstone's assertion that "the law will not suppose a possibility
of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer
' 48 Thomas McKevitt, Note, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification
Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818 (1996) (discussing the history and
evolution of the doctrine of necessity, which allows for a biased judge to hear a case
when no impartial arbiter can be found).
:!49 Geyh, supra note 19, at 708.
ir.o United States v. Kehlbeck, 766 F. Supp. 707, 713 (S.D. Ind. 1990) ("As a
professional, a judge is presumed to be capable of distini,,"Uishing his personal life from
his professional obligations.").
m See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
m Mann v. Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Judges are trained to
lay aside personal opinions and experiences when they sit in judgment.").
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impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption and idea,"253 should be put to rest. Once the
foundation for self-recusal falls away, it becomes clear that self
recusal allows disqualification motions to be decided by the judge
who is personally involved in the matter and has a direct interest
in the outcome of the recusal motion. This means that judges
deciding their own recusal motions are acting as judges in their
own cases. In fact, the Court has explained in other contexts that
even a long-accepted law may be unconstitutional if the factual
premises supporting that law are no longer true.254 A practice
must stand or fall based on factual reality of the world, not on
faulty assumptions of yesteryear.
This change in constitutional meaning is not unique to the
recusal context. For example, laws that discriminated against
women were historically upheld based on a factual
misunderstanding about the genetic differences between men and
women.255 In a number of cases, most famously Bradwell v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court relied on the outdated assumption
that women belong in the home to uphold statutes that treated
women differently than men. 2 56 But once that understanding was
discredited, a law that was widely viewed as constitutional in the
nineteenth century might "become" unconstitutional in the
twenty-first.257 Sometimes, it is essential that the law becomes
unconstitutional due to changed factual circumstances in order to
protect liberty; sometimes, to protect equality; and in the context
of recusal, to protect impartiality. Today's judiciary need not

m See 3 WILLIAL\i BLACKSTONE, COMM~'.NTAmBS *361.
m United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("[Tjhe
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts
may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.").
2., See Steven G. Calabrcsi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 TEX. L. Ri.;v. 1 (2011).
&>6
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring);
sec also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
257
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 544-45, 558 (1996) (holding
that VMI's exclusion of women violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the
reasons for excluding women from VMI were obsolete). Of course, the law does not just
"become" unconstitutional. It was unconstitutional all along. In other words, the Due
Process Clause has always meant that people were entitled to an impartial judge, but
it took hundreds of years for us to realize that this principle is inconsistent with the
practice of self-recusal.
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perpetuate Blackstone's factual errors in deciding whether a
certain practice violates the Due Process Clause.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education,258 the Supreme
Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, explaining that the Court
"cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in light
of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation."259 The Court went on: "Whatever may
have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding is rejected."260 Thus, changed circumstances change the
meaning and the application of a constitutional provision, despite
existing Supreme Court case law to the contrary.261
And while most of these examples involve substantive rules,
procedural rules, too, are subject to the same analysis. For
example, the Court recently invalidated an old rule of criminal
procedure that permitted defense counsel not to convey plea offers
to their clients. 262 The Court reasoned that a new rule was
required because "plea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel
have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities
that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages."263
So to answer Justice Scalia's hypothetical, self-recusal
became unconstitutional when our knowledge and understanding
of the Bias Blind Spot and other self-enhancement biases reached
the point where the factual assumptions underlying self-recusa]
could no longer support the practices they were intended to

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 494-95 (footnote omitted).
261 The Court asked a similar question in many contexts. For example, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court explained that it was important to determine "whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification." 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
262 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
26'3 Id. at 1407.
m

m
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support. The Due Process Clause, of course, is not a panacea, and
just because something is bad does not mean it is
unconstitutional. Some critics of the frequent recourse to the Due
Process Clause termed the resort to the clause as the "nuclear
option."264 But the evidence is overwhelming. In this context,
given the state of our understanding of human nature, and with a
functional understanding of recusal as a dispute involving the
judge, we are left _with the inescapable conclusion that self-recusal
violates the most fundamental principle of due process: the right
to an impartial judge.

IV. AVOIDING UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Although some courts appear to recognize the problems with
self-recusal,265 few solutions have been implemented. In this
section, I suggest some ways that courts (and other actors) can
reform recusal procedures to comply with the requirements of due
process.266 Then, I will look at how these changes can be
implemented, in particular at the Supreme Court level, and some
other advantages for judicial independence and impartiality that
such changes can bring, as well as some potential drawbacks of
each alternative.

A. Peremptory Challenges
One option that avoids all constitutionality concerns is to
implement a system of preemptory judicial disqualification, akin
to peremptory challenges permitted in nearly every state for juror
disqualification. In fact, nineteen states have adopted just such an
approach, giving a party an opportunity to request a judicial
™ Swisher, supra note 15, at 347.
265 Stern Bros., Inc. v. McClure, 236 S.E.2d, 222, 225 (W. Va. 1977) («It appears to
be the general rule that a judge before whom a disqualification motion is filed should
not hear the merits of the motion. . . . The reason for this rule is rather obvious.
Without it, the judge is placed in the difficult position of attempting to judge a matter
which involves him directly and personally. No man can be a judge in his own cause.").
2ss There is a separate question of who should implement these proposals. For the
reasons discussed above, judges have an obvious self-interest in keeping recusal
decisions in their own hands. This leaves legislatures as the obvious solution, but there
are potential separation of powers concerns with legislators imposing recusal rules on
the judiciary. For a good discussion of this issue, see Virelli, Congress, supra note 5, at
1555.
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substitution without the need to convince the challenged judge of
her partiality. 267 The obvious advantage of such an approach, for
the purposes of this Article, is that it entirely eliminates the self
recusal problem. In addition, there are three other advantages.
First, the procedure is not time-consuming, since it does not
require a protracted inquiry into the challenged judge's conduct
and eliminates the need for the issue to be considered on appeal.
Second, this procedure offers an effective solution to a constant
source of trepidation for a litigant concerned about a judge's
impartiality-that the recusal motion will anger the target judge,
who, after all, will remain on the case if he declines to recuse.
Finally, the peremptory challenge procedure eliminates concerns
associated with requiring a target judge's friend and colleague to
consider his friend's bias.268
But there are also some potential concerns. First, some
scholars have expressed concern that the procedure will be abused
by attorneys to delay the proceedings and to judge-shop.269 For
example, an attorney, or a group of attorneys, may always seek to
disqualify judges seen unfavorable to their cause, regardless of the
judge's impartiality. Furthermore, the peremptory challenge
procedure may damage the reputation of the judiciary by
undermining the presumption of judicial impartiality that was so
prevalent under common law. Finally, since the recusal procedure
can only be used a limited number of times,210 courts must resort
to their default disqualification procedures (often self-recusal) for
any subsequent disqualification request.
Thus, the procedure is not perfect, and may lead to frivolous
disqualification requests as well as some administrative
interruption. Nonetheless, peremptory challenges are a potential
step in the right direction, and more state, and federal, courts
ia 7 See FLAMM, supra note 16, at 762-65 (explaining how peremptory challenges of
judges operate); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, FAIR COURTS:
SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 26 (2008), auailabte at http:llwww.brennan
center.org/content/resource/fair_courts_setting_rccusal_standardsl (idcmtifying the
nineteen states permitting peremptory challenges of judges).
•M See infra Part IV.B.
269 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, 1'he Elusive Goal of Impartiality,
97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 212 (2011) (stating that "the most common objection to [a
peremptory challenge] procedure is the fear of potential judge-shopping'').
270 In most states that permit peremptory disqualification, such challenges arc
limited to one per side.
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should consider whether implementing such challenges can help
protect judicial impartiality.

B. Other Judge(s)
The second alternative that eliminates the self-recusal
problem is to allow another judge, whether on the same court as
the target judge or on a different court, to decide the recusal
motion. As with the peremptory challenge proposal, shifting the
recusal decision away from the target judge answers the
constitutional objections. No longer is the challenged judge acting
as a judge in his own case, and the appearance concerns are also
obviated.
This solution also raises some perception concerns, insofar as
the procedure sends a message that judges cannot be trusted. In
addition, expanding the process creates a concern about efficiency:
while a frivolous motion can be quickly disposed of by the
challenged judge, requiring the assigned judge to transfer the
disqualification motion to another judge might be used to disrupt
the administration of the courts. 2 71 In addition, some have
questioned whether a third party-any third party-can make a
well-reasoned decision given that the target judge is often the only
one who knows all the facts that must be considered and that led
to the recusal motion in the first place. After all, the "judge
himself is likely to have or know the information most relevant to
a determination of actual bias, such as financial connection to one
of the parties, familial relationship with one of the parties, or
participation as a lawyer in the litigation at an earlier stage."272
But here, too, the objections can be rebutted. Despite some
inefficiency, bringing in a third party decisionmaker is consistent
with the tenets of the Legal Process Theory, which emphasizes the
importance of a neutral arbiter for dispute resolution. It also
271
This could be particularly problematic in jurisdiction with only a few judges. See
United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (''The judiciary would
be seriously crippled in the states or territories having only one or two federal judges if
it were necessary to send to another state to get a judge to hear the motion.") (footnotes
omitted).
212 Shcrrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 617 n.56 (2002); see also Leslie W.
Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REY. 543,
546 (1994) (explaining that judges best know their "thoughts" and "feelings").
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avoids the self-assessment-bias problems discussed in Part IJI.273
Additionally, the procedure could require the target judge to first
consider the motion and issue a written opinion.274 1'his would
allow the challenged judge to make the initial disqualification
decision, and if the judge felt that recusal was necessary, she
could step aside without the need for a third party judge to become
involved. And in denying the disqualification motion, the target
judge would be required to write an opinion explaining the reason
for her decision, thus creating a record that a reviewing judge
could rely on.275 The party's motion, along with the target judge's
decision, would give a third party judge sufficient factual
background to decide the recusal issue. These two documents can
essentially serve as adversarial briefs.276 Making the task easier is
the fact that the third party judge would not be required to decide
whether the challenged judge is actually biased, but rather
whether there is an appearance of bias. Another way to mitigate
the concern about litigants abusing the new recusal procedure is
to give judges the authority to sanction attorneys who file
frivolous or abusive motions. A reviewing judge would review the
motion for legal sufficiency, and the party filing a frivolous motion
could be forced to bear the costs associated with the delay.
Furthermore, the delay concerns could be minimized by the
creation of a national system that allows for disqualification
motions to be referred to judges from other jurisdictions who could
decide the motions more quickly or who have the time and
resources to reach the motion promptly.

See supra Part III.A.
m See Frost, supra note 51, at 535 (discussing the importance of reasoned written
opinions).
m This gets around the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia in his opinion denying
the recusal motion in Cheney. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Scalia
explained that the media's description of the facts was misleading, or even flatly
wrong. Under my proposed procedure, the third party judge would have not only the
media accounts and whatever other documents that the moving party used to support
its recusal motion, but also the target judge's decision explaining what actually
happened.
i 16 See Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation ofPowers in the Law of Precedent, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1422 (2012) (discussing the importance of adversarial
briefing to overcoming some of the most common cognitive biases).
213
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C. Outsiders
The final, and perhaps the best, potential solution to the self
recusal problem is to allow observers outside the judiciary to play
a more active role in the recusal process. There are a number of
ways this could be done. For example, states could create
committees made up of laypeople as well as attorneys that could
offer guidance to judges on recusal issues, and perhaps even
review judges' recusal decisions. Although such a committee would
be unprecedented on the recusal issues, states have created
similar committees to monitor judicial campaign conduct.211
Likewise, states that have adopted the Missouri Plan for judicial
selection21s have created judicial performance evaluation
commissions that review the work of judges and provide the public
with an evaluation that the public can use in deciding whether to
retain those judges.279 At the federal level, Congress likely has the
power to create a separate office devoted to judicial ethics-an
Inspector General for the Court.280 The Inspector General's office
could have a panel, or a set of panels, devoted to immediately
reviewing disqualification decisions made by federal judges.
These independent recusal commissions or Inspector General
panels have a number of potential advantages. First, these
commissions "could identify best practices and encourage judges to
set high standards for themselves."281 This would give judges the
advice they need when faced with difficult recusal issues, and offer
judges a defense when criticized for their non-recusal decisions.2s2
But giving the commission the power to disqualify judges
m See Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining
Respectability in the Post· White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2005\
27
~ See Dmitry Barn, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 559
& n.31 (2014) (summarizing the Missouri Plan process).
279 Id.
at 588-91 (describing the work of judicial performance evaluation
commissions in a number of states).
280 Ronald Rotunda has made a similar recommendation outside the recusal
context. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial
Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301 (2010). There
are some separation-of-powers concerns associated with such a proposal, but that issue
is outside the scope of this Article.
'"' SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 267, at 7.
2 •• On the other hand, if a judge chose to ignore the commission's advice, it would
create negative publicity for the judge, perhaps ensuring that the judge will provide
clear reasons for his decision not to disqualify despite tho rccusal recommendation.
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eliminates a major concern with allowing other judges to make
such decisions. Judges hesitate to impugn each other's
impartiality, so even though shifting the recusal decision to a
different judge eliminates the due process concerns associated
with self-recusal, such a procedure raises a separate concern. That
is, the worry that judges would be too deferential to their
colleagues, hesitant to create animosity on the court. As the
Seventh Circuit explained,
Ll]udges asked to recuse themselves hesitate to impugn their
own standards; judges sitting in review of others do not like to
cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the
honesty and care of the judge whose conduct has been
questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety
standard under § 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual
impropriety. So although the court tries to make an external
reference to the reasonable person, it is essential to hold in
mind that these outside observers are less inclined to credit
judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary
itself will be.283
As always, there are drawbacks with any proposal, and the
drawback with this proposal is the potential inefficiency involved
in bringing third parties into the recusal controversy. There is a
risk that a recusal proceeding will become a side-show to a trial,
adding significant delay (and potentially expense) to a proceeding.

D. Collateral Benefits
No solution to the self-recusal dilemma is perfect. But most
importantly, adopting one of these recusal procedures can address
due process concerns while also fostering an appearance of
impartiality. In addition, a more stringent recusal system enforced
by neutral judges helps address two other related concerns about
judicial impartiality. Both of these concerns arise in the context of
judicial elections.284 First is the problem created by the Supreme

'""' fore Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
284 Approximately ninety percent of American judges face the electorate to attain, or
retain, their position in office. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State
Supreme Court Justices, 39 Wil.LAMBTIE L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003). Concern about the

2015]

RECUSAL AND DUE PROCESS

1193

Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.285 In White, the
Supreme Court held that candidates in judicial elections have a
First Amendment right to announce their views on controversial
issues they may face as judges after election.2ss Anticipating the
concerns that would be raised by the academy-concerns that
these judges will have precommitted themselves to ruling a
certain way on particular issues-Justice Kennedy suggested in
his concurrence that a more stringent recusal regime may be the
way states can protect parties from (arguably) biased judges. 287
But that suggestion may be somewhat na'ive if the same judge who
had, while campaigning, promised voters to rule in a particular
way in a future case, is put in charge of deciding whether he
should hear that case in the first place.288 For Justice Kennedy's
suggestion to truly act as a solution, a different judge than the one
who made the campaign promises should decide the recusal issue.
The second problem that changes to recusal procedures can
address is the "Caperton problem." Here, the challenge to judicial
impartiality comes not from the Supreme Court decision itself, but
from the fact that candidates in judicial elections must often raise
funds to succeed in those elections, and those funds frequently
come from the same parties and lawyers who will appear in front
of those judges. Once again, recusal has been offered as a potential
solution to the concern that these elected judges will feel a debt of
gratitude to the parties that elected them,289 or animosity towards
parties that supported the judge's opponent. The Supreme Court
itself held in Caperton that due process may require recusal under
these circumstances. 290 But it is difficult to see how self-recusal
does anything but impede those goals. The greater the debt of
gratitude towards a contributor, and the greater the animosity
effect of judicial elections on judicial independence and impartiality is one of the most
written about topics in the legal literature.
2s.; 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2iw; Id. at 788.
2s1 Id. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 ss The judge might be worried about how the voters would react if he recused
himself from the very cases where he promised to rule a certain way. Such recusals
may make it less likely that voters would re-elect the judge during the next election
cycle.
'" 9 In addition, the judges may try to curry favor with those lawyers and parties in
the hope that they would contribute to the judge's next reelection campaign.
29 ° Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009).
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towards the contributor of an opponent, the less likely the judge is
to step aside. Bringing in a neutral decisionmaker, one removed
from the need to keep financial backers and the electorate happy,
is the only way recusal can act to address the due process concerns
in cases like Caperton.
CONCLUSION

The self-recusal procedure followed by the majority of state
and federal courts in the United States is best understood as a
vestige of the historical approach to recusal. It has been criticized
by a number of scholars, but this Artic1e concludes that the
procedure is unconstitutional. Although that verdict may seem
shocking at first, given the historical pedigree of the practice, that
conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's precedent
interpreting the Due Process Clause. Taking the recusal decision
out of the hands of the challenged judge will help ensure that the
cases are heard by an impartial jurist, as well as ensure public
confidence in the courts.

